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INDETERMINACY, JUSTIFICATION AND

TRUTH IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN *
In this Article, ProfessorLipkin continues the debate over the nature of indeterminacy in constitutionaltheory, arguingthat epistemic indeterminacy is most relevant to the law, because epistemic indeterminacy is more closely tied to practical
reasoning than is metaphysical indeterminacy.
ProfessorLipkin further argues that the controversy over metaphysical or epistemic indeterminacyis really a controversy over truth orjustificationas the primary
form of validating constitutionalrules. In ProfessorLipkin's view, the searchfor
constitutionaltruth should be abandonedor, at best, should be treatedas a trivial
result of the best justification.
Finally, Professor Lipkin proposes a new constitutionalparadigm. integrating a
revised version of Rawls's conception of wide reflective equilibrium with a modified account of Kuhn's theory of scientific change that takes into account the
distinction between normal and revolutionary adjudication. Such a paradigm.
ProfessorLipkin argues,provides an interestingand complete account of constitutionaladjudication and change and therefore is an especially appropriatevehicle
to transport constitutionaltheory into the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION

AORE than any other single factor, the specter of indeterminacy is2
responsible for the current crisis' afflicting constitutional theory.
I
The traditional controversy over indeterminacy assumes that if constitutional language is indeterminate, constitutional law is illegitimate, arbitrary, or radically manipulable in the hands of power-hungry judges and
other constitutional actors. Mainstream constitutional theorists attempt
to defend against the charge of indeterminacy; 3 while deconstructionists,4
skeptics, 5 nihilists, 6 and others keep the heat on by insisting that, despite
traditional apologetics, constitutional doctrine does not provide determinate answers to controversial constitutional questions.
I want to cast the problem of indeterminacy in a new light. In my
1. Generally, the crisis consists of the failure of mainstream constitutional theorists
to describe convincingly plausible paradigms and procedures for discovering and validating constitutional decisions. In particular, this crisis results from a loss of faith in the
formalist and neo-formalist paradigms that dominate mainstream legal reasoning. Because they promise political neutrality, formalist paradigms are very attractive. See
Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (contending that laws derive from
politically neutral rules embedded in legal language). Judicial reasoning, in turn, employs
these rules to generate "true" legal judgments. Formalist paradigms thus insist that judicial reasoning can uncover the immanent rationality in the law. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949, 953-54 (1988).
According to neo-formalist paradigms, constitutional and legal problems, though not politically neutral, follow from the best interpretation of the legal system as a whole. See
generally R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986). Both formalist and neo-formalist theorists
insist that law significantly constrainsjudicial decisions, and believe that formalist or neoformalist paradigms are the law's best hope.
2. The crisis I speak of is not restricted to constitutional law; it affects legal theory
generally. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Foreword The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 43, 99 (1989) (stating that "the future of constitutional law and scholarship hinges
on repudiating the foundation of the Rehnquist Court's approach to constitutional lawthe majoritarian paradigm"); Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 639, 679 (1990) (contending that "the legal academy is experiencing a state of epistemological crisis"); Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and
the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 69, 71 n.5, 72-73 (1991) (describing the crisis in legal theory as continuous with the crisis in academic philosophy, both
crises being implications of post-modernity) [hereinafter Lipkin, Kibitzers]; see also H.
Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 39 (1983)
(arguing that the Western legal "tradition itself is threatened with collapse"); G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 81, 85 (1974) (contending that the general theory of contract has died and what remains in its wake has been absorbed by tort law); P. Atiyah,
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 778 (1979) (calling for a new theoretical structure for the law of contract).
The impact of this crisis is greater in constitutional theory because constitutional law
affects critical rights and liberties, as well as the very structure of American government.
Moreover, in common law and commercial law, no one document defines the law, as does
the United States Constitution in constitutional law.
3. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The
Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 833-41
(1990) (characterizing mainstream theorists) [hereinafter Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism].
4. See generally D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 148 (1990).
5. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 816-26.
6. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism in Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1,
47-51 (1984).
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view, the question of law's determinacy is more complex than the standard controversy suggests. The problem of law's determinacy is not
merely a problem about the nature of constitutional doctrine or language.7 Instead, it is a problem about the appropriate paradigm for validating constitutional propositions.'
Understood in this fashion,
defenders of determinacy owe their allegiance to a paradigm of truth.9

For these theorists, truth is the central philosophical concept explaining
why we adhere to particular constitutional values. To validate a particular constitutional conclusion concerning free speech, for example, that
conclusion must follow from a constitutional principle truly contained in
the Constitution or in the values underlying the Constitution.10
In contrast, defenders of indeterminacy"' owe their allegiance to justification, leaving truth to metaphysicians and logicians. In their view,
truth is an uninteresting, and even perhaps a deceptive, jurisprudential
7. According to the standard controversy, whether law is "determinate" depends
upon whether constitutional language constrains judicial decision-making-that is,
whether constitutional language admits of only one meaning. Cf Boyle, The Politicsof
Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L Rev. 685, 708-13

(1985) (arguing that even the most simple language will always admit more than one
meaning because words themselves do not have one particular meaning).
8. I do not mean that the parties to this debate consciously conceive of the issue in
this way or would even welcome this characterization.
9. One immediate objection should be dispelled here. One could argue that no one
believes in constitutional or legal truth, and that such a belief is naive, at least if we have
satisfactorily learned our lessons from legal realism and critical legal studies. In one
sense this objection is correct. Few constitutional scholars talk about constitutional or
legal truth. Instead, they speak of good interpretations or what the framers meant by a
constitutional provision. See R. Bork, The Tempting of America 143-60 (1990). Nevertheless, we should not forget that some distinguished legal theorists still insist that truth is
a useful legal notion. See R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 225; Moore, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 107, 138 (1989). More importantly, despite
the way constitutional theorists speak, some theorists insist that there exist uniquely correct answers to most legal questions. See R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 226. Others
believe that there are principled and perhaps correct answers to questions over the degree
of generality associated with rights. See Tribe & Dorf, Levels of Generalityin the Defini-

tion of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1098-1106 (1990). Further, some theorists contend that the distinction between truth and justification is vital, and that conflating the
two engenders confusion. See J. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, in Markets,

Morals and the Law 3, 4-7 (1988); see also infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text
(discussing Coleman's thesis). Finally, others insist that legal scholarship seeks truth,
even if advocacy does not. See Kronman, Foreword.Legal Scholarshipand Moral Educa-

tion, 90 Yale L.J. 955, 968 (1981). Consequently, truth still has a hold on legal
imagination.
10. Constitutional theorists wedded to truth assume that any given power, liberty, or
right is either in the Constitution or it is not. This does not mean that defenders of
determinacy must adhere to some crude form of textualism or intentionalism. Ronald
Dworkin adheres to neither, and yet still believes, as does Robert Bork, that only certain
rights are truly in the Constitution. See generally R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 363-73; R.
Bork, supra 9, at 161-70, 178-85. Both Dworkin and Bork, therefore, share the same
fundamental presupposition about constitutional truth, with their difference arising out of
how to explicate this presupposition.
11. See Boyle, supra note 7; D'Amato, supra note 4; Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra

note 3; Singer, supra note 6.
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concept. Instead, constitutional theorists should describe and unify the
diverse forms of constitutional justification. Justifying constitutional
conclusions is a meaningful and necessary activity even if no one ever
comes up with a philosophically or jurisprudentially respectable theory
of truth. Indeed, worrying about truth is just as pointless as worrying
about whether some activity is really constitutionally protected, once we
have concluded that the best justification says it is constitutionally protected. If the notion of truth needs to be retained at all, according to this
view, then one should say that a constitutional conclusion is true because
it follows from a principle whose justification is superior to the justifications of alternative principles. In other words, no independent conception of truth is needed.
In this Article, I defend the indeterminacy thesis against the important
objection 2 that proponents of indeterminacy often confuse metaphysical
indeterminacy with epistemic indeterminacy.'" I conclude that whether
we endorse this distinction for other purposes, it is especially inappropriate in constitutional theory because epistemic indeterminacy is the central form of indeterminacy associated with constitutional reasoning. I
then discuss the issue of truth and justification in constitutional theory,
concluding that constitutional theorists, judges, and practitioners should
abandon truth in favor of justification. The central feature of my thesis is
that truth does not have the explanatory force it is typically thought to
have. Consequently, whether constitutional statements are true is irrelevant to the process of constitutional litigation and adjudication. What is
relevant is the refinement and unification of the various forms of constitutional justification-such as originalism, non-originalism, passivism,
and structuralism-as well as the determination of whether a more general justificatory paradigm underlies constitutional reasoning.' 4
Finally, I want to sound a cautionary note concerning the perilous
period in which constitutional theory now finds itself. Constitutional and
legal theorists are desperately seeking novel and unifying paradigms
around which to rally. For at least the past two decades, there have been
a proliferation of different theoretical movements, each sporting a novel
paradigm around which to consolidate and normalize constitutional adjudication. 15 No one paradigm has prevailed, nor has any paradigm pro12. See Kress, A Preface to EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 134,
134-38 (1990) [hereinafter Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy].
13. See id. at 138. Kress succinctly explains the distinction between metaphysical
and epistemic indeterminacy. According to Kress, "[m]etaphysical indeterminacy speaks
to whether there is law; epistemic indeterminacy to whether law can be known." Id.
(emphasis in original). More generally, however, the metaphysical or semantic dimension of a statement "X is law" asks whether that statement has truth conditions, whereas
the epistemic dimension asks whether those truth conditions can be known. According
to this distinction, it makes perfect sense to say that " 'X is law' is true," despite our
inability in principle to know whether it is true.
14. See infra notes 167-89 and accompanying text (discussing such a paradigm).
15. Critical legal studies, feminism, and law and economics are just some of the more
prominent examples. See, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 103-16 (1987) (ar-
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vided the stability required for conducting traditional or normal
constitutional litigation, adjudication, and research. 6 Moreover, it is not
clear that constitutional law and scholarship will ever again be dominated by one central paradigm, as perhaps was the case during the age of

formalism or when legal realism reigned over law's empire.1 7 Nonetheless, trying to fashion a synoptic vision of constitutional adjudication and
theory is beneficial, even if doing so merely shows us that such attempts
are quixotic. Thus, in this Article, I continue the search for such a
paradigm.
My candidate for the correct justificatory paradigm in constitutional
theory relies on two familiar methodologies, one in ethical and legal theory, and the other in the philosophy of science. I intend to deploy a
revised version of Rawls's conception of wide reflective equilibrium' I and
integrate it with a modified account of Kuhn's notion of scientific
change.19 One salient feature of this revised paradigm is its anti-foundational, anti-formalist, pragmatic dimension, which renders it an especially appropriate vehicle to transport constitutional theory into the
twenty-first century.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY: METAPHYSICAL
OR EPISTEMIC?

Constitutional determinacy requires that constitutional concepts and
principles of inference have a univocal meaning. Partial determinacy occurs when constitutional reasoning generates coherent, univocal answers
from the perspective of an individual practical reasoner. In contrast, full
determinacy exists when constitutional reasoning generates the same
conclusions for other qualified constitutional practitioners. If such important constitutional provisions as "due process" or "equal protection"
admit of different meanings, or permit different rules of reasoning, then a
guing for the transformation of masculine jurisprudence); R. Unger, The Critical Studies
Movement 1-14 (1986) (criticizing traditional liberal legal theory); R. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Law 19-26 (3d ed. 1986) (formulating an economic approach to law);
see also Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 599, 602-32
(1989) (discussing alternative jurisprudential paradigms).
16. See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text (discussing normal and revolutionary litigation).
17. This remark is, of course, hyperbolic. No single paradigm has ever dominated
constitutional law and scholarship. Still, the structure of constitutional theory and practice never seemed more fragmented then it does now. Nor has it ever appeared less likely
that constitutional theory and practice will be unified by a central paradigmatic vision.
18. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51 (1971); see also Nielsen, In Defense of
Wide Reflective Equilibrium, in Ethics and Justification 19-35 (D. Odegard ed. 1988)
(explaining and defending wide reflective equilibrium). In brief, wide reflective equilibrium maintains that acceptable legal and ethical judgments are those that follow from a
plausible theory of our practical lives. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
19. See generally T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). A Kuhnian notion of scientific change depicts two kinds of inquiry-normal and revolutionary
inquiry-which structure the evolution of conceptual change. See infra notes 167-71 and
accompanying text.
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qualified, constitutional actor-namely, a judge or lawyer-will not be
able to generate coherent, univocal constitutional conclusions for herself.
More importantly, even if determinate constitutional conclusions are
possible from the individual perspective, full determinacy requires that
these conclusions constrain other qualified, constitutional actors in relatively similar situations.2" If such constraints fail, constitutional actors
will interpret these provisions in different, even incompatible, ways. In
this event, constitutional reasoning fails as a form of practical reasoning,21 and therefore cannot settle practical conflicts.2 2 The fact that
equally competent constitutional actors systematically disagree over the
meaning of due process or equal protection strongly suggests that these
terms are indeterminate.2 3
A.

IntersubjectiveAgreement and Rationality

The indeterminacy debate implicates the notion of rationality. Specifically, it questions the relationship between intersubjective agreement and
rationality. Can two practical reasoners interpret constitutional and
legal provisions incompatibly and still both be rational? My hunch is
that rationality is exhausted within the context of a coherent perspective,
tradition, or language-game. In other words, rationality requires intersubjective agreement.
This neither praises nor denigrates rationality. It merely reveals the
place of rationality in human inquiry. What lies outside rationality is
sometimes irrational and absurd. At other times, what lies beyond rationality is visionary insight into new forms of description, which ultimately captures the imagination of the age. Consequently, rationality, or
the forms of inquiry to which it applies, is sometimes very important, but
it is also often mundane and pedestrian. Thus, while it is correct to say
that rationality requires intersubjective agreement, this should not be
construed as capturing everything of interest about human intellectual
inquiry.
20. Of course, this is too strong. A judge is not completely free to do anything she
likes. But neither is she compelled to choose a uniquely right answer. She must, instead,
choose from a range of different, even incompatible, solutions.
21. Practical reasoning involves reasons for acting or deciding to act, while theoretical reasoning involves reasons for believing. See R. Audi, Practical Reasoning 2 (1991).
22. Constitutional provisions and values can be indeterminate in additional ways.
For instance, constitutional provisions might be indeterminate because their scope or degree of generality cannot be fixed once and for all. Similarly, constitutional provisions
might be indeterminate because they involve more than one value and these values can be
ranked differently. Each form of indeterminacy has the potential to yield a skeptical
result-namely, that constitutional reasoning does not constrain choice.
23. Mere disagreement does not entail indeterminacy. Nevertheless, when disagreement occurs in epistemically favorable circumstances-that is, in circumstances where
qualified individuals ordinarily have the best chance for getting the right answer-the
inability to resolve conflicts needs to be explained. One such explanation is that the issue
is indeterminate.
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In an earlier article,2 4 I must not have been clear on this point, because
Professors Kress and D'Amato both take me to task for insisting, incorrectly in their view, that intersubjective agreement is a necessary condition of rationality. In Kress's view, an argument for indeterminacy based
on dissensus is unpersuasive. 25 In responding to my criticism of his important work on indeterminacy, Kress points out that two individuals
can both be rational, though endorsing different conclusions, if each individual's evidentiary base is different or if their evidentiary bases overlap. 26 Kress asserts that my mistake is in assuming that "if A has
evidence which is rational warrant for X, and B has evidence which is
rational warrant for Y (inconsistent with X), then it follows that there is
indeterminacy.,

27

His argument continues:

Yet A and B might have different evidence, and it would therefore not
be surprising if they reach opposing conclusions. Put precisely, if A's
evidence is C, D, and E, while B's evidence is E, F, and G, then there
may well be both a metaphysically and epistemically right answer
(quite possibly different than either X or Y). This is because A and B
do not have all the evidence. Only if A and B had precisely the same
evidence, or if all the relevant evidence were available to each [and] A
and B rationally came to different conclusions would it follow that
there is indeterminacy, epistemic or metaphysical.28
Two points are in order here. First, it is not at all obvious that indeterminacy is limited to circumstances in which both parties base their conclusions on all the relevant evidence. The fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause, for example, is indeterminate if it can be interpreted
according to both my radically egalitarian views and your meritocratic
views, despite one or both of our conclusions being based on only part of
the relevant evidence. Thus, indeterminacy occurs when a constitutional
provision yields different interpretations despite the reasons for these
differences.
Moreover, even if we concede Kress's point that indeterminacy occurs
only when parties to a dispute base their positions on all the relevant
evidence, his argument against indeterminacy is still unpersuasive. Most
controversial constitutional decisions in cases such as abortion, affirmative action, the right to die, consensual homosexuality, flag burning, capital punishment, and so forth are, or easily could be, based on all the
evidence. In fact, in controversial cases, typically all the relevant evidence is available to any qualified party. 9 What explains the indetermi24. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 833-41.
25. See Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 12, at 140. Professor Kress
argues that the objections to legal determinacy raised by critical legal scholars can be
answered. See Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 283, 320-36 (1989) [hereinafter, Kress, Legal Indeterminacy].
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 12, at 140-41.
Id at 140.
Id at 140-41.
I am not using the term "evidence" in the standard legal way, pertaining to infor-
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nacy in these cases is how each party assesses the evidence.3a In some
cases, the evidence is weighed or ranked differently. In other cases, certain pieces of evidence are rejected out of hand. Thus, in order for constitutional conclusions to be determinate, the evidentiary base must have
the same character for each party. In other words, each party must identify, weigh, and rank the relevant values in the same fashion. Because
that is seldom the case, it follows that indeterminacy exists at least in
these controversial cases.
Even if all the relevant evidence is available to everyone, which evidentiary premise one should choose is itself indeterminate, even in relatively
uncontroversial cases. Because equally qualified practitioners often view
the evidence differently, different conclusions will follow. The problem is
that constitutional justification, like any justification, involves arguing
from premises to a conclusion, and your conclusion will differ from mine
if your premises differ. What is thus needed is a meta-theory to tell us
how to evaluate evidence and which premises to adopt. The process of
generating conclusions is epistemically indeterminate-at least, if pushed
far enough-because no one has yet figured out how to guarantee that
one's opponent will adopt one's own premises unmodified. 3' Consequently, even if we concede Kress's point concerning indeterminacy and
having the same evidentiary base, this simply removes the question of
indeterminacy from conclusions to premises.3 2
Kress's argument for metaphysical indeterminacy is vulnerable to a
further objection. In any system of justification having more than one
value or applying the same value in different ways, determinate metaprinciples are needed to determine how to rank these different values, or
how to apply a singular value to different circumstances. Without metaprinciples, constitutional conclusions will be metaphysically indeterminate, because any such system having multiple values or multiple applications of the same value can in principle generate multiple
conclusions.33 Even if most of these conclusions are unlikely, their possibility means that the system is conceptually or metaphysically
indeterminate.
Kress's reply here is that indeterminacy is not established by showing
mation used by the trier of fact to decide a case. My use is broader, referring to all the
evidentiary considerations upon which, for example, an anti-abortion position depends,
including constitutional provisions, statutes, natural law, social psychology and so forth.
30. It would be useful here if Kress explained just what relevant evidence is, and how
legal conclusions are derived from this evidence.
31. Kress needs to explain why two equally qualified practitioners differ over the relevant evidentiary bases for their judgments of P and not-P respectively. Such an explanation will, I believe, reveal the indeterminate justificatory structure of legal reasoning.
32. Furthermore, Kress's argument risks the problem of incommensurability. If
Jones and Smith differ over abortion because of radically different evidentiary bases, then
their views on abortion are unresolvable because they have incommensurable evidentiary
bases.
33. Any comprehensive system of law will have multiple values or at least multiple
applications of the same value.
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that the legal system can generate different conclusions.'
Instead,
"[m]etaphysical determinacy may be said to exist if there is a best argument for one side, no matter by how little. Moreover, metaphysical determinacy may exist even where we are currently unable to determine
which argument is best."35 Kress here appears to be following Dworkin,
who insists that "propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow
from the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process that
provide the
best constructive interpretation of the community's legal
36
practice."
Both Kress and Dworkin implicitly share the view that there is a sharp
distinction between truth and proof. According to this view, it makes
perfect sense to say that a particular sentence is true, despite our inability
in principle to prove it true. 37 Thus, a particular constitutional conclusion-for instance, that affirmative action is consistent with equal protection-might be true, although its truth may never be established, even in
principle. Although this position may have relevance in formal symbolic
systems, this is precisely the sort of pointless theorizing that should be
excised from constitutional theory. While certainly the best argument or
best constructive interpretation might temporarily elude practitioners,
we must nevertheless set limits concerning how long and in what way a
statement's truth is compatible with our inability to prove it true.38
Truth is a trivial epistemic concept that the best argument gets by default. One cannot say that we are unable to determine which argument is
best without attempting to explain this inability to prove truth. In other
words, the notion of a "best argument" only makes sense in the context
of proof.39 While it is perfectly reasonable to believe that at any given
time the best argument has not yet been formulated, this becomes idle,
wishful thinking when adequate time, energy, and talent have been devoted to resolving a particular controversy.'
34. See Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 12, at 145.
35. Id
36. R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 225.
37. See R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 137-38 (1985) (denying that truth requires
demonstration).
38. Anyone sensitive to law's purpose as a system of practical (normative and motivational) reasons should be reluctant to accept any conception of truth that sharply distinguishes between the truth and proof.
39. To deny this, as Dworkin does, is to permit the possibility of true answers to
constitutional conflicts that are totally irrelevant to practical reasoning because they are
unknowable. The pragmatic turn in constitutional theory rightly scoffs at this notion.
40. Andrew Altman argues that disagreement does not entail indeterminacy, because
"[s]ome judges are likely to be much better than others at grasping the logical connections among the elements of a large body of propositions and seeing which (principle o0
decision coheres best with the settled law." A. Altman, Critical Legal Studies 49 (1990).
But this begs the question of whether, in controversial cases, one decision logically coheres best with the settled law. Does anyone really believe that logic or reason will settle
the abortion controversy? Similarly, will logic or reason resolve the conflicts over affirmative action, gender equality, the right to die, or capital punishment? Disagreement may
not entail indeterminacy, but unresolvable disagreement among comparably talented
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ConstitutionalDoctrine and JudicialReasoning

Constitutional indeterminacy challenges the widespread belief that
constitutional doctrine constrains or significantly guides choice in cases
of conflicting fundamental values. If the meaning of constitutional reasoning is determinate, then it should constrain a judge's decision. If it is
indeterminate, it cannot. Moreover, the problem of indeterminacy implicates the independence of constitutional law as an autonomous discipline
possessing its own concepts and principles of inference. If constitutional
reasoning is autonomous and generates determinate conclusions, then it
represents a form of reasoning distinguishable from ethics or politics, and
can therefore independently generate solutions to constitutional conflicts.
But, if constitutional reasoning generates both X and Y, and X is incompatible with Y, then the choice between X and Y must be made according to extra-constitutional factors or not be made at all. In this event,
there is no difference between constitutional reasoning and ordinary
practical (moral or political) reasoning. Moreover, unless ethical and
political conclusions exist that constrain any reasonable person, constitutional reasoning cannot constrain or significantly guide choice in settling
constitutional controversies.4 1
To counter this objection, a defender of determinacy must show how
constitutional doctrine constrains or significantly guides choice. The primary problem with Kress's distinction between metaphysical and epistemic indeterminacy is its irrelevance to this question. Metaphysical
determinacy is irrelevant to choice unless it includes epistemic determinacy. In other words, if the meaning of constitutional propositions is
metaphysically determinate, but not epistemically determinate, it has no
effect on constitutional reasoning, and consequently cannot show the legitimacy or competence of constitutional law. 42 Thus, any defense of
judges and other legal actors provides evidence, sometimes conclusive, that a belief in a
uniquely correct decision is quixotic.
41. If constitutional reasoning depends upon moral reasoning, then constitutional
reasoning constrains choice only if moral reasoning constrains choice. Accordingly, the
equal protection clause constrains judicial choice only if it contains a moral conception of
equality that all rational, moral agents must endorse. If an individual is free to adopt an
alternative moral conception of equality, however, then doing so will give a meaning to
the equal protection clause that others need not endorse. Because choice is constrained
or significantly guided across persons only when they share the same paradigms, the
equal protection clause constrains choice across persons only when individuals agree on
the appropriate moral conception of equality. Should they disagree, they may interpret
the equal protection clause as they please.
42. In an earlier article, I made the following point against Kress's defense of
determinacy.
Kress insists that "[l]ike classical mathematics, law may be ontologically determinate, even if there is no explicit meta-theory that 'tells us' precisely what the
law is." But even if law is ontologically determinate, what good is this for constitutional practitioners? And how does it refute epistemic skepticism? Even if
it makes conceptual sense to speak of law as ontologically determinate, unless
this determinacy makes its presence felt in recognizable legal arguments, then
its existence is useless.
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legal determinacy must start out with a defense of epistemic determinacy.
Accordingly, Kress's disclaimer that he was primarily concerned with
metaphysical indeterminacy-and not epistemic determinacy-is a nonstarter.4 3 If he was primarily concerned with metaphysical determinacy,
then he was wrong from the outset. 44 Because metaphysical determinacy
does not save a constitutional system from being incompetent or illegitimate if the system is epistemically indeterminate, epistemic indeterminacy has the same implications for constitutional theory as metaphysical
indeterminacy. Thus, the first job in defending legal determinacy must
be to dispel epistemic indeterminacy. Thus, the question of constitutional indeterminacy is ultimately a question of epistemic indeterminacy.
Without knowing the univocal meaning of a constitutional proposition,
even if such meaning exists, constitutional practitioners cannot be constrained or significantly guided by the law of the case.
Kress's mistake is to view metaphysical indeterminacy and epistemic
indeterminacy as independent values.4" The independency thesis mainLipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 841.
I renew this challenge here. Even if a constitutional provision has a determinate metaphysical or ontological meaning, and even if we know that it has a determinate meaning,
if no epistemically determinate method exists for ascertaining exactly what this meaning
is, we are in the same position we would be in if the provision were metaphysically
indeterminate.
43. Consider Kress's remark that "Lipkin claims that Legal Indeterminacy fails to
adequately address epistemic indeterminacy. This understates the case. Indeed, he
would be more accurate if he claimed that I ignored the issue. This is not surprising,
however, since my topic was metaphysical, or ontological, as opposed to epistemic indeterminacy." Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy,supra note 12, at 140. But, isn't epistemic indeterminacy the death-knell of legal determinacy? How, then, can one simply
"ignore" the question of epistemic indeterminacy in a defense of legal determinacy?
Kress might respond that conceptually there exist two questions concerning indeterminacy in law. First, are there determinate legal truths? And second, how do we know
them? Accordingly, Kress's argument might continue, in Legal Indeterminacy he was
concerned with the first question because it is logically prior to the second question. Determinate legal truths must exist before we can come to know them. While I would agree
that there are two questions involved in this controversy, they are not independent questions. Nor can we answer one independently of the other. See infra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text. For there to be determinate legal truths, we must be able, at least in
principle, to know them.
44. Kress's position is unpersuasive for yet another reason. Kress contends that "law
may be ontologically determinate, even if there is no explicit metatheory that 'tells us
precisely' what the law is." Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 25, at 332 (footnote
omitted). But, if there is no explicit meta-theory, is there an implicit one? And, if there is
no meta-theory at all for determining what the law is, then how can law be ontologically
determinate?
45. Kress states that my views on indeterminacy overlap with Bentham's. See Kress,
EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 12, at 140. Let me take this opportunity to
mention three differences.
Bentham uses the charge of indeterminacy not as a skeptical weapon, but instead as a
problem of unwritten common law rules-a problem that can be overcome by expressing
the common law in written statutes that are thereby accessible to everyone. See J. Bentham, A Fragmenton Government, in A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment
on Government 402 n.e (J. Burns and H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977). In contrast, the contemporary charge of indeterminacy is a skeptical challenge attempting to show that (i) law
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tains that a law can be either metaphysically indeterminate or epistemically indeterminate, or both.4 6 Abandoning the notion of truth, however,
also means rejecting the independency doctrine. A law cannot be metaphysically determinate without also being epistemically determinate.
While knowing the meaning of a constitutional provision necessarily
means that it has a meaning, it does not follow that we can separate the
metaphysical meaning from the epistemic meaning of a provision. Yet,
such a separation is exactly what is involved in suggesting that a constitutional provision might have meaning that is in principle unknowable.4 7
Once we abandon the notion of truth, unknowable meanings are tantamount to no meanings at all.
C.

The Seduction of Truth

The seduction of the concept of truth is sometimes so pronounced that
it affects even defenders of indeterminacy. Consider, for instance, Professor D'Amato's ingenious example designed to show that rationality does
not involve intersubjective agreement. He writes:
I think our minds are wired to notice similarities and differences in the
environment; this wiring has enabled us to survive as a species. Suppose nine primitive hunters noticed a similarity between a new animal
they encountered and a friendly animal of their previous acquaintance,
but the tenth hunter noticed what was to him a critical difference that
suggested that the newly encountered animal was vicious. If the nine
hunters perished and the tenth ran safely away, his gene that passed on
to future generations might well be characterized as "don't let people
talk you out of a dangerous situation." Intersubjective agreement, or
rule by consensus, would have been fatal in the hunter situation. a
Professor D'Amato appears to interpret the claim that intersubjectivity is required for rationality as equating the meaning of the "right answer" with consensus. His lone practical reasoner's choice was,
evolutionarily speaking, appropriate despite being unpopular. Either he
was right or his comrades were right. If he was right, no consensus is
needed. If they were right, consensus is the only thing that is needed,
and that is counter-intuitive in the extreme.
For this example to work, however, D'Amato needs a conception of
truth as opposed to justification. As D'Amato's story goes, the judgment
(language) does not constrain judges, and (ii) if judges are constrained at all, we must
look elsewhere for the source. Similarly, Bentham contends that indeterminacy must be
overcome, see id., whereas, in my view, indeterminacy can never be entirely overcome.
Finally, and most importantly, constitutional indeterminacy shows that it is quixotic to
think that one right answer exists to many of the constitutional controversies which define contemporary society.
46. The "independency thesis" is my name for regarding metaphysical and epistemic
features of rules as conceptually distinct values.
47. This suggests a constraint on what can count as law. To reject the independency
thesis entails that legal meanings must be knowable in principle.
48. D'Amato, supra note 4, at 184 n.125 (emphasis in original).
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of the pre-historic survivor was true, while the judgment of his comrades
was false. This is curious, because D'Amato's powerful deconstructionist
arguments seem to avoid truth. D'Amato is correct in asserting that
truth ought not to be equated with justification,4 9 but surely for a deconstructionist like D'Amato, the concept of truth must be suspect.
Should D'Amato appeal to justification instead of truth, his example
fails. No real dichotomy exists between consensus and justification.
Consensus alone, brought about by intimidation, drugs, or inattention, is
not the basis of justification. Yet, getting the right answer without consensual validation is truth, not justification. To resist this dichotomy, we
must determine what sort of consensus is relevant to justification. The
answer is simple: justification is consensus by "qualified" individuals.50
This does not mean that a consensus of such qualified individuals guarantees truth, or that consensus renders a conclusion certain. Nor does it
mean that we should equate justification with consensus. Nevertheless, a
consensus of qualified individuals is the best evidence-until we have better evidence-that the judgment in question is justified.
D'Amato's example does not confute this point. If his example works
at all, it is only because a consensus of socio-biologically sophisticated
individuals-us-now believe that his lone practical reasoner's choice
was rational and the consensus's choice was irrational."' Consequently,
for D'Amato's example to be effective, he must be wrong about the connection between rationality and intersubjectivity.
D'Amato fails to distinguish between the context of discovery and the
context of validation. In important conflicts, we need not have intersub49. See id. at 188 n. 141; D'Amato, Can Legislatures ConstrainJudicialInterpretation
of Statutes?, 75 Va. L. Rev. 561, 594-95 (1989).
50. Different qualifications might be required in different circumstances. We can,
however, list some features which any "qualified" individual should possess-namely,
intelligence, experience, empathy, sensitivity, intuitiveness, and so forth.
51. D'Amato might insist that consensus on the resolution of a practical conflict is
irrelevant to the rationality of the resolution, even after being considered in the appropriate circumstances by the qualified practical reasoners. If so, it is difficult to understand in
what sense the resolution is rational. Rational argument, especially in law, seeks consensus through free and open argument. Indeed, it is only by agreement on legal paradigms
that normal litigation and normal constitutional problem-solving can occur.
This notion of rationality as consensus need not entail applying antecedently-existing
criteria through which people discover the right answer. Nor does it imply a uniquely
right answer to constitutional conflicts. Instead, rationality as consensus suggests the
notion of coming together, negotiating, or compromising after considering the various
alternative resolutions to a particular constitutional problem.
The notion of rationality as achieving consensus is one Rorty approvingly attributes to
Dewey:
Dewey wanted to get rid of the idea that new ideas or practices could be judged
by antecedently existing criteria. He wanted everything to be as much up for
grabs as feasible as much of the time as feasible. He suggested that we think of
rationality not as the application of criteria (as in a tribunal) but as the achievement of consensus (as in a town meeting, or a bazaar).
R. Rorty, Cosmopolitanism Without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-FrancoisLyotard,
in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I at 217 (1991).
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jective agreement when discovering, devising, or formulating a judgment.
When we validate that judgment, however, intersubjective agreement
must be necessary in principle for confirming our individual results. If
not, we have retreated to a radical form of subjectivism about justification, or what's worse, we have embraced justificatory solipsism. Thus,
D'Amato's lone practical reasoner must achieve consensus with some intersubjective group-at the very least, us-for his judgment to be validated ultimately.
D. Consensus and the Role of Normal and Abnormal Meaning
Constitutional rationality, as the consensus of qualified practitioners,
constitutes normal constitutional reasoning. 2 Constitutional practitioners need not always endorse the same conclusions. But, they must share
the same paradigms as to what counts as a good argument, what is probative evidence, and what is an appropriate source of law. Furthermore,
they ought to share many of the same conclusions and principles of inference upon which these conclusions depend.
The problem with appealing to normal constitutional reasoning as the
basis of law, however, is the existence of controversial cases that are beyond the reach of normal adjudication. For instance, proponents and
opponents of affirmative action do not share the same constitutional paradigm for equality or for remedying past discriminatory practices. Nor
do those for and against abortion share the same paradigm of privacy
and liberty. Capital punishment, federalism, free speech, privacy, the
right to die, and so forth all exist at the periphery of normal adjudication.
Until these questions are normalized,53 if ever, they will admit only indeterminate answers.
Once we rid ourselves of the unfortunate dichotomy between metaphysical and epistemic indeterminacy, we realize that constitutional provisions have a univocal meaning if, and only if, qualified constitutional
52. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60 (explaining normal and abnormal
meaning).
53. Constitutional controversies are normalized when the constitutional community
agrees on the appropriate paradigms and methods for solving problems in that area of
constitutional law. The present framework for analyzing due process and equal protection issues pertaining to social and economic matters illustrates this point. Prior to 1937,
economic regulations were strictly scrutinized. After the 1937 revolution, see infra notes
190-194 and accompanying text, consensus was finally achieved. Unless a regulation burdened a fundamental right or suspect class, the Court should deferentially determine
whether the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985); Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982); see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-91 (1973)
(suspect class); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-44 (1973)
(suspect class and fundamental right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 631-33
(1969) (suspect class and fundamental right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967)
(fundamental right); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-96 (1954) (suspect
class); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (fundamental
right).
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practitioners agree on what the provision means, and on the type of reasoning appropriate for resolving controversies pursuant to that meaning.
This agreement explains why so-called "easy" cases are easy. In easy
cases, qualified constitutional practitioners agree on the meaning of the
constitutional provisions and on the type of reasoning relevant to resolving these cases. 4 This pervasive agreement, however, establishes neither
metaphysical determinacy nor epistemic determinacy. Easy cases, such
as the age requirement for the presidency, are easy so long as no circumstances exist in which a compelling political or moral argument can be
asserted for interpreting the relevant constitutional provision in an atypical way. In fact, because it is not difficult to conjure up such atypical
interpretations, a case's status as easy or difficult depends not on the normal meaning of the term alone, but on the reasons for restricting oneself
to the normal meaning.
When the price is right, we will quickly substitute an abnormal meaning of the term for its normal meaning. For example, if we were unable
to elect a president unless she were younger than thirty-five, we would no
longer need or desire to restrict ourselves to the normal meaning of that
constitutional provision."5 Instead, we would begin to talk about sufficient maturity and so forth. This shifting from normal to abnormal
meaning can be done systematically, and making such a shift is entirely a
political, rather than a semantic, decision.5 6
The shifting from normal to abnormal meaning contexts is related to
Kress's final defense against my attack. He writes:
Finally, Professor Lipkin claims that a form of modified skepticism is
demonstrated by the existence of controversial appellate cases such as
abortion and racial issues. If he wishes to call modified skepticism
what I have called moderate epistemic indeterminacy, that is fine with
me. I do not wish to quarrel over terminology. The important issue is
what such cases demonstrate. My contention is that a modest number
of such controversial, or, if you wish, indeterminate cases, is5 not
suffi7
cient to establish that a constitutional system is illegitimate.
If Kress grants moderate indeterminacy, then he must explain why
meaning is constant in easy cases and not constant in the controversial
cases.5" Indeed, taking the controversial cases seriously enables us to see
54. See supra note 53.
55. Several commentators have described circumstances in which this scenario would
be plausible. See D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the UnderAged President, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 250, 250-51 (1989); Fish, Still Wrong After All These
Years, 6 L. & Phil. 401, 404 (1987); Lipkin, The Anatomy of ConstitutionalRevolutions,
68 Neb. L. Rev. 701, 742-43 (1989) [hereinafter Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions].
56. This does not mean that the normal meaning is the real meaning of the provision.
On the contrary, both normal and abnormal meanings are equally real or valid. The
notion of a provision's real meaning is exactly the sort of analytic construct that we
abandon once we rid ourselves of the notion of truth.
57. Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 12, at 141.
58. Should Kress reply that easy cases are easy because their metaphysical or ontological meaning is determinate, then he still must provide us with a theory of meaning
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that what decides cases is not constitutional meaning, reasoning, or argument. Rather, it is contestable moral and political values that decide a
case. Consequently, even if Kress is correct that most cases involve determinate principles-but some controversial cases do not-he has conspicuously failed to explain this phenomenon. Put simply, why is the
meaning of the constitutional age requirement for the presidency determinate, but not the meaning of the equal protection clause?
The answer is obvious. Normal meaning-the meaning the sentence
has for a native speaker of the language in ordinary circumstancesprevails only when there are political and moral reasons for it to prevail.
Or, to put it more precisely, normal meaning prevails only when no
moral or political reasons exist for its failure. Consequently, moral and
political reasons always ultimately determine how we are to understand a
constitutional conclusion, rather than its allegedly unique constitutional
or legal meaning. Moreover, if moral and political reasons are always
necessary for a particular meaning, then words have constant meanings
only if those moral and political values are constant, and this is seldom
the situation in controversial cases. When neither meaning nor the moral
and political values supporting a particular meaning are constant, a constitutional system does not have the capacity to guarantee the same conclusions in relevantly similar circumstances. Hence, it can not uphold
the traditional conception of the rule of law.
The point of saying that the meaning of constitutional propositions is
determinate is to support the notion that constitutional language alone
constrains our understanding of the Constitution. In this way, constitutional propositions purportedly tell us what to do, and we should heed
their admonitions if we are rational. If, however, it turns out that a constitutional proposition has a univocal meaning only when certain other,
constitutionally extrinsic factors obtain,59 then the ultimate source of this
meaning lies in these factors and not in constitutional discourse. 6' The
indeterminacy thesis thus insists that abnormal (i.e., non-literal) meaning
can always preempt normal meaning in appropriate circumstances.
Consequently, we must distinguish a stronger version of the indeterminacy thesis from a weaker version. The stronger version contends that
that shows us how constitutional meaning is determinate. Without such a theory, how
else are we to judge whether to retain his notion of determinate meaning?
59. These conditions include a commonality of purpose, as well as the absence of any
serious challenges to these purposes or to the normative values underlying the law.
60. As an illustration, if any law is determinate, it is the law requiring a maximum
speed of 55 miles per hour. But this law has a univocal meaning only because we share
the same purposes of car safety and energy conservation, as well as a need (in these
circumstances) for quantitative precision in achieving these purposes. In these circumstances, no one will seriously argue that a 55 miles per hour speed limit means simply
"don't drive too fast;" further, in cases of this kind, we agree on a rather straightforward
method of justification-namely, look at the traffic sign. Suppose, contrary to fact and
plausible imagination, that twenty-five percent of all male drivers suddenly suffered heart
attacks when driving under sixty miles an hour. In this case, the speed limit law might
develop an exception or a non-literal interpretation.

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY

constitutional provisions are now and perpetually indeterminate. 6 In
contrast, the weaker version contends that constitutional provisions are
either indeterminate or, if not, can always become indeterminate in the
appropriate circumstances. 62 The stronger version ties meaning to language, insisting that constitutional language is indeterminate as a fact
about language, while the weaker ties meaning to context, insisting that
some contexts permit a univocal answer and some do not. The weaker
version is sufficient to show that a constitutional system is not competent
to generate the same answer in similar cases. And, this incompetence is
at the heart of both law's indeterminacy and law's illegitimacy.
Similarly, it is for this reason that Professor Greenawalt's interesting
attempt to demonstrate law's determinacy misses the point. 6a Professor
Greenawalt wants to defend the "modest claim about determinacy" that
"many legal questions have determinate answers."'
According to
Greenawalt's concept of determinacy, a legal question has a determinate
answer if (1) it "would be arrived at by virtually all those with an understanding of the legal system," 65 and (2) it is "unopposed by powerful
arguments,
consonant with the premises of the system, for contrary
66
results.",

Greenawalt successfully describes circumstances in which law can be
determinate. 67 But the indeterminacy issue, as I understand it, challenges the source, not the fact, of one right answer existing in any given
case. To be a proponent of determinacy, you must believe that a constitutional question has one right answer, and that the answer derives solely
from the meaning of the law, independent of our purposes, needs, aspirations, and context. In other words, you must believe in the acontextual
meaning of law.6" If sometimes one right answer can be derived contextually, then it is absurd to deny that only one right answer exists in that
61. For theorists whom I consider to abide by a stronger version of indeterminacy,
see Boyle, supra note 7; D'Amato, supra note 4; Singer, supra note 6.
62. In other words, constitutional provisions are always potentially indeterminate.
For a work demonstrating a weaker version of indeterminacy, see Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3.
63. See Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1990).
64. Id at 29.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Parts of Greenawalt's argument read like a phenomenology of the contextual
meaning of imperatives. For example, Greenawalt describes in detail how we comply
with such simple imperatives as "please shut the door." See id at 6-7. In this regard, his
argument is very instructive. But such a phenomenology, rather than doing away with
contextual meaning, makes contextual meaning central to understanding imperatives.
Where there is contextual meaning, in turn, there is always the possibility of
indeterminacy.
68. No one should deny that we can describe a context, even systematically, where
one right answer exists. For example, the 55 miles-per-hour speed limit means that no
one is legally permitted to drive faster than 55 miles-per-hour in a vehicle on the highway
in ordinary circumstances. Of course, the weasel words "in ordinary circumstances" trivialize the results, while nevertheless showing how contextually one right answer can exist.
The problem is that the weasel words are often contestable.
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particular context.6 9 The indeterminacy controversy need not challenge

the fact that sometimes constitutional questions have one right answer.70
Rather, it needs only to address the traditional explanation of this fact.
A defender of determinacy must rely on the meaning of constitutional
discourse in explaining the one right answer, while defenders of indeterminacy appeal to discourse, purposes, political and moral factors, and so
forth. In short, defenders of indeterminacy appeal to factors extrinsic to
constitutional and legal discourse.7 1
E. Legal Positivism and PracticalReasoning
The source of Kress's distinction between metaphysical and epistemic
features of law can be found in Jules Coleman's important and illuminating article on positivism.7 2 In distinguishing between two ways of understanding the concept of a rule of recognition, Coleman writes:
In one sense, the rule of recognition is a standard that one can use to
identify, validate or discover a community's law. In another sense, the
rule of recognition specifies the conditions a norm must satisfy to constitute part of a community's law. The same rule may or may not be a
rule of recognition in both senses, since the rule one employs to determine the law need not be the same rule as the one that makes law
determinate. This ambiguity between the epistemic and semantic interpretations of the rule of recognition pervades the literature and is
responsible for a good deal of confusion about the essential claims of
legal positivism. In my view, legal positivism is committed to the rule
of recognition in the semantic sense at least .... 73
In Coleman's view, a rule of recognition must be semantically ade69. Professor Greenawalt argues that "the answer to the question of whether certain
actions and events carryparticularlegal consequences is often clearly negative," and that
"any thesis which asserts that answers to legal questions are invariably indeterminate is
incorrect." Greenawalt, supra note 63, at 5. I am unpersuaded by this argument. Greenawait is quite right that "life is filled with acts, like scratching one's nose and putting
one's socks on, that patently do not give rise to legal liability. The norms of any legal
system are determinate in their nonapplicability to countless human activities." Id. at 32.
This, however, is an unilluminating notion of determinacy. The problem of indeterminacy challenges us to show that there are uniquely correct answers to legal problems.
Greenawalt comes no closer to this goal by attempting to show that legal norms are
determinate in their non-applicability to many human activities.
70. In other words, there are lots of easy cases. For example, no one would presently

take seriously an argument that the Constitution permits naturalized citizens to become
president. But why is this case easy? Is it because the language of the Constitution precludes such presidential candidates once and forever? I doubt it. Rather, it is because the
normal meaning of the Constitution precludes it, and there are no pressing political,
moral, or constitutional reasons to shift from normal to abnormal meaning.

71. Indeterminacy can be established without endorsing this strong view. A system
of rules is indeterminate when the meaning of its statements derive from the context of
people's needs and purposes. Contexts, needs, and purposes may vary, and consequently,
the possibility always exists that abnormal meaning will replace normal meaning. That is
all that is needed to demonstrate indeterminacy.
72. See J. Coleman, supra note 9.
73. Id. at 5.
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quate, though it might be epistemically inadequate. In other words, legal

positivism is committed to the view that truth conditions exist for any
statement of law, even when we do not know that they exist. Legal posi-

tivism contends that the sentence "'X is law' is true" is a meaningful
sentence, despite our inability to verify its truth in principle.
Given the aims of a legal system-namely, to inform the public and
guide action-what possible reason could a positivist have for regarding

semantic and epistemic senses of a rule of recognition as independent
notions? In order to achieve these positivist aims, a rule of recognition
must be epistemically adequate. It must, therefore, tell people how to
recognize, identify, pick out, verify, or discover that a particular norm is
a bona fide law. While some positivists might insist that an epistemically
adequate rule of recognition must be semantically adequate, this is simply another way of saying that the epistemic and semantic senses of the
rule of recognition are dependent notions, and that to know whether a
norm is a law entails that it is a law.74 Separating these dimensions so

that a rule of recognition might be semantically adequate but epistemically inadequate, as Coleman suggests, is a position that no self-respecting positivist should adopt.7"
Coleman invokes a sharp distinction between accepting the same rule
74. A rule of recognition, as an epistemic notion, tells you how to determine whether
a particular norm is a law. Thus, if you want to know whether the speed limit is 55
m.p.h., you must look at the sign or look it up in the statute book. A semantic conception of a rule of recognition that merely describes the truth conditions of particular laws,
without supplying a methodology for determining whether these truth conditions exist, is
simply pointless. Positivism needs to tie truth conditions to practical reasoning, and
therefore the truth conditions must be tied conceptually to the process of coming to know
what the law is. Consequently, whereas positivism need not reject the distinction between
the epistemic and semantic dimensions of a rule of recognition, it should deny that these
dimensions exist independently. The truth conditions of a positivist rule of recognition
must include epistemic conditions. The truth conditions for the sentence "X is a law"
must include reference to the process by which the law becomes known, even if it is as
trivial as saying that X is a law if and only if the relevant legal actors come to regard it as
legally binding.
Positivism's raison d'etre is to answer the epistemic imperative that natural law and
theological conceptions of law failed to answer-namely, how can I come to know what
the law is? Positivism's resounding answer to this question is to provide the social factsfor example, the product of legislatures and courts that are available to everyone directly
or through representation by experts--that tell you what the law is. Thus, only by insisting upon a legal system that is epistemically adequate does positivism guarantee that law
is relevant to an individual's social and political life.
75. Positivists, such as Coleman, insist that a rule of recognition is a social rule, and
"[s]ocial rules can have normative force in that they have a prescriptive or reason-giving
dimension." Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 703, 705
(1991). Social rules provide reasons for action only when "citizens accept[ ] them from
an internal point of view." Ie But, then, for citizens to accept a rule of recognition from
the internal point of view, the rule must be epistemically adequate-that is, the citizens
must be able in principle to know the meaning of the rule. A semantically adequate, but
epistemically inadequate, rule of recognition cannot be accepted from the internal point
of view, and consequently cannot provide reasons for action. Hence, positivism cannot
countenance semantically adequate, but epistemically inadequate, rules of recognition.
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of recognition and identifying the same standards as legal ones. He
writes:
Suppose the ... rule of recognition states, "The law is whatever is
morally correct." The controversy among judges does not arise over
the content of the rule of recognition itself. It arises over which norms
satisfy the standards set forth in it. The divergence in behavior among
officials as exemplified in their identifying different standards as legal
ones does not establish their failure to accept the same rule of recognition. On the contrary, judges accept the same truth conditions for propositions of law; that is, that law consists in moral truth. They
disagree about which propositions satisfy those conditions. While
there may be no agreement whatsoever regarding which standards are
legal ones-since there is no agreed upon standard for determining the
truth of a moral principle-there is complete agreement among judges
concerning the standards of legality. That judges reach different conclusions regarding the law of a community7 6does not mean that they are
employing different standards of legality.
Is it really plausible to insist that judges who systematically reach different conclusions might be employing the same standards of legality?
Suppose, for instance, that three judges hold the following legal positions. Judge Jones maintains that law is whatever is morally correct and
believes that moral correctness is what helps others. Judge Smith maintains that law is whatever is morally correct, and believes that moral
correctness is what is in one's self-interest. And Judge Thomas maintains that law is whatever is prudentially correct where prudential correctness involves acting in one's self-interest.
In Coleman's view, Judge Jones and Judge Smith share the same legal
standard of moral correctness, a standard that is different from Judge
Thomas'. Yet, this is counter-intuitive in the extreme. In fact, because
Judge Smith and Judge Thomas understand "self-interest" in the same
fashion, they will share the same concrete judgments and are likely to
decide cases the same way. The fact that Judge Jones and Judge Smith
share the same legal standard, using Coleman's terminology, has no
practical effect at all.
To insist, as Coleman does, that these judges share the same standard
is to invoke a distinction between an abstract formulation of a standard
and the concrete propositions which give the standard content. As an
abstract matter, Judges Jones and Smith agree that law is whatever is
morally correct; so, they both accept morality as the abstract standard of
legality. Nevertheless, both judges fill in the content of this legal standard in radically different ways-so different that it is difficult to see how
they hold the same actual standard. The more radically different the
contents of two legal rules, the less plausible it is that these rules express
the same standard of legality. In short, there simply is no such thing as a
76. J. Coleman, supra note 9, at 20.

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY

standard of legality, or the same standard of legality, independent of the
concrete propositions which give it content.
Consequently, the distinction Coleman seeks to establish here yields
implausible results. In Coleman's view, Judge Smith and Judge Jones
have the same standard of legality-moral correctness-despite the fact
that they inevitably and predictably decide cases differently. Yet, Coleman would also claim that Judge Thomas has a different standard of
legality from both Judge Jones and Judge Smith, despite the fact that her
decisions will be similar to Judge Jones'. In other words, two judges
sharing the "same standard of legality" decide cases differently, while
two judges holding different standards of legality make the same judicial
decisions. Clearly something has gone wrong.
Another example of misusing the distinction between the metaphysical
and epistemic dimensions of law is illustrated in Charles Silver's criticism
of Ronald Dworkin's treatment of Elmer's Case.77 It is instructive to
examine this controversy.
Dworkin criticizes positivism for being unable to explain decisions in
hard cases, such as Elmer's Case.7" In Dworkin's view, positivism tells
judges to decide the case according to the decision sanctioned by the rule
of recognition.7 9 When the rule of recognition is silent, however, judges
are permitted to use their discretion to legislate in resolving the conflict.
Consequently, if positivism provides an accurate explanation of judicial
reasoning, judges in hard cases should not probe the law for the right
answer. Instead, once a judge sees that the rule of recognition is silent,
she should decide the case with abandon. Judges, however, do probe the
law in hard cases; thus, positivism fails to explain actual judicial practice.
Silver argues that Elmer's Case does not, as Dworkin insists, provide a
counter-example to positivism.8 0 Following Coleman's lead, Silver distinguishes between the epistemic and semantic purposes behind a rule of
recognition. Epistemic purposes concern verifying the legality of a rule,
while semantic purposes concern the truth conditions for propositions of
law."' For Silver, a rule of recognition may serve one purpose and not
the other.8 2 In other words, a rule of recognition may be either epistemically adequate or semantically adequate.8 3
77. See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) ("Elmer's case").
78. In Riggs v. Palmer,Elmer murdered his uncle in order to inherit his uncle's fortune. See 115 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189. Thus, the question before the New York
Court was whether a murderer could take under his victim's will. See id.
79. See R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 34.
80. See Silver, Elmer's Case: A Legal PositivistReplies to Dworkin, 6 L. & Phil. 381,
380-89 (1987).
81. See id at 389.
82. See id
83. Thus Silver writes:
For example, the rule of recognition in use in the United States is epistemically
adequate because it sets out a test in light of which legality can be verified: if
Congress enacted a bill that contained a norm and the President signed the bill
into law, the norm is law, and otherwise not. But the rule "God's will is law,"
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Especially on positivist grounds, 4 it is curious that a rule of recognition may be semantically adequate though not epistemically adequate.
Any self-respecting positivist should reject, as illegitimate, a permanently
epistemically inadequate rule of recognition. 5 The purpose of a rule of
recognition is not to identify the truth conditions of propositions of law
from some neutral vantage point. Instead, its purpose is to tell actual
agents how to determine, identify, or validate a norm as a bona fide law.
Thus, the central function of a rule of recognition is tied to practical
reasoning. A rule of recognition that is merely semantically adequate
cannot identify genuine statements of law, and hence cannot provide
legal reasons for action.8 6
I am not denying the validity of distinguishing between semantic and
epistemic matters for every conceivable purpose (nor am I affirming this
distinction).8 7 Because law is tied to practical reasoning, it is necessary
for a practical reasoner-a judge, an attorney, or a citizen-to possess
the appropriate legal information in order to make a decision. This in-

formation, in turn, must be built into the conception of law, as positivism
does. Semantic conceptions of law that are epistemically inadequate fail
to provide this information.
which could also be a rule of recognition, would be only semantically adequate.
It establishes truth conditions for propositions of the form "The law is X"such propositions are true just when X is God's will-but it establishes no tests
for determining which norms-which Xs-comport with God's will. In other
words, the rule "God's will is law" provides no authoritative method of divining God's will, even though it provides an authoritative criterion for the truth of
propositions of law.
Id.

84. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
85. Postema makes a similar point in characterizing Bentham's conception of law.
"Bentham," according to Postema,
combines both 'ontological' [metaphysical] and 'epistemic' functions of criteria
of validity in a single set of criteria. In fact, the 'epistemic' function drives his
positivist conception of validity, for the social problem which calls for law, on
his view, is at bottom an epistemic one: the problem of making certain rules and
standards of conduct a matter of public, common knowledge.
G. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 317 (1986) (citation omitted). In
my estimation, the social problem of making law public is a function of the law's pragmatic project-namely, to provide a system of norms that can be used in (judicial) practical reasoning to settle legal conflicts.
86. Consequently, a positivist cannot accept just any rule as a possible rule of recognition. Positivism must eschew rules that are epistemically inadequate-for example, a rule
which says that law is what is morally correct-unless, of course, moral correctness is
epistemically discernible. While a rule of recognition might start out as epistemically
inadequate, it cannot remain so. Unless it is made epistemically adequate, it cannot be
the legal system's rule of recognition. In the example of moral correctness, the rule of
recognition is made epistemically adequate by providing an intelligible procedure for determining moral correctness. Positivism, then, imposes constraints on the form and content of a rule of recognition.
87. In other contexts, I have adopted similar distinctions. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 821-22; Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism and Constitutional

Revolutions, 21 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 645, 695-96 n.165 (1988) [hereinafter Lipkin,
Conventionalism].
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Because positivism concerns itself in the first instance with the epistemic adequacy of a rule of recognition, it explicates the concept of law in
terms of clearly identifiable social facts-facts that in principle are
equally accessible to everyone. Consequently, positivists must eschew
epistemically inadequate rules of recognition. Indeed, both Coleman's
and Silver's examples of semantically adequate but epistemically inadequate conceptions of law-law is what is morally correct and law is
God's will-are examples of conceptions of law that no one (certainly no
positivist) has ever in fact held. Natural law and theological conceptions
of law, in contrast, always include an epistemological way of determining
what the law is."8 In other words, such conceptions of law always attempt to be epistemologically adequate, although they might fail due to
inadequate epistemologies. Thus, because actual historical conceptions
of law are conceptually tied to procedures for determining what the law
is, Coleman's conception of semantic adequacy without epistemic adequacy is a pure fiction. 89
The above argument leaves us with one final question. If metaphysical
conceptions of law are pragmatically pointless, and law is epistemically
indeterminate, how do we explain the low rate of appellate dissents?
Although I have sympathy for the ideological view-namely, that appellate decisions reflect the ideology of the rich and powerful-I do not believe it is the whole story. Instead, I believe that legal practitioners draw
some of the same conclusions over a host of legal problems because these
conclusions serve common purposes.9'
This says nothing about how law or doctrine constrains judges. Indeed, if our circumstances or purposes change, then law changes. Moreover, because the same purposes are not always widely shared, law's
meaning is often actually indeterminate, and is always potentially indeterminate. Nevertheless, when people have shared goals, they will often
agree on the legal result. These circumstances describe normal litigation,
and agreement over a conceptual paradigm is necessary for normal litigation to operate. Moreover, the agreement driving normal litigation is
88. See J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 64-69, 85-90 (1980) (arguing that
values such as knowledge, life, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasoning,
and spirituality are self-evidently good). Nevertheless, without some conception of how
we know that these values are good (or what it is to know that they are good), it is
difficult to assess the claim that they are good. Moreover, simply asserting that these
activities are self-evidently good, all things considered, tells us very little. Certainly, we
can believe that some value is good without even beginning to understand how much of it
is good, or how it should be ranked in a hierarchy of values. In short, we can make
abstract pronouncements about values without the slightest idea of how to express those
values in actual life.
89. A rule of recognition that is only semantically adequate is tantamount to a rule of
recognition that is applicable only from a God's-eye view of the world. On positivist as
well as pragmatic grounds, such notions should be excised from jurisprudence.
90. The situation is more complex than this suggests. Sometimes, the purposes are
common only to a particularly powerful group of citizens. Ideally, however, these purposes are common to all citizens.
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necessary even for raising the great controversial cases of the day. Consequently, because normal litigation is necessary for any legal system,

even one that is seriously incomplete, the fact of a low dissent rate (if it is
a fact) should not be surprising. Even with sufficient indeterminacy to
warrant a modified form of legal skepticism, 9 1 there must be considerable
92
agreement for the legal system to be a legal system in the first place.
Because it has special relevance here, I will anticipate my argument
from Part II. Constitutional theorists should jettison the notion of constitutional truth. 93 Once abandoning truth, the distinction between metaphysical determinacy and epistemic determinacy loses much of its force.
No longer will a great divide exist between truth and justification, or
between the real meaning of a constitutional provision and the meaning it
derives from social practices. This does not suggest that no gap exists
between what a constitutional provision-such as due process or equal
protection-means and what judges say it means. Rather, this gap is a
critical device used to encourage constitutional criticism and change. 94
The Constitution means what judges say it means, but actual judges
should say that the Constitution means what judges in ideal circumstances would say it means. 95 The goal of constitutional interpretation
makes reflective, thoughtful agreement the central feature of constitutional justification.9 6 This agreement, in turn, is guided by agreement in
91. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 824-26.
92. There are also some rather mundane reasons for agreement in appellate decisions.
The appellate caseload and the strain of hearing the same sort of cases-for example,
social security cases and writs of habeas corpus-incline even the most maverick judge to
seek agreement and conciliation whenever she can.
93. For a further discussion of this point, see infra Part II.
94. Consider Rorty's account of how pragmatists view the distinction between truth
and justification.
They see the gap between truth and justification not as something to be bridged
by isolating a natural and transcultural sort of rationality which can be used to
criticize certain cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap between the
actual good and the possible better. From a pragmatist point of view, to say
that what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is simply to say that
somebody may come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always room
for improved belief, since new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a whole new
vocabulary, may come along.
R. Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical
Papers Volume I at 22-23 (1991) [hereinafter Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?].
For Rorty, seeking truth is a quixotic attempt to get out of our skins. Similarly, Rorty
denies that we can understand the term "human conscience" as anything but a contingent product of history. See Rorty, The Seer of Prague, 205 New Republic 35, 39-40
(1991). Human conscience is not transcendental; it is contingent through and through.
To say, however, that human conscience is not identifiable with any particular culture is
not, pace Rorty, to go beyond history or attempt to get out of our skins. It merely is an
attempt to retain what is good in each culture and to shed the bad. Of course, good and
bad are here pragmatic notions that mean helping or impeding us to cope with our
environment.
95. In my view, theories of judicial interpretation are theories of what judges in ideal
circumstances say the Constitution means.
96. We never get beyond socially-confirmed, reflective judgment. Consequently, con-
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ideal circumstances which, to paraphrase Rorty on a different issue, gives
us everything
we could possibly hope for from a theory of constitutional
97
truth.
II.

A

PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
AND TRUTH

Defenders of constitutional determinacy are wedded to truth as the
paradigm of constitutional validity. Advocates of indeterminacy, in contrast, are wedded to a paradigm of justification. Their concern is with
which proposition is more solidly justified, not with whether the proposition has truth conditions.9" Proponents of indeterminacy99 see justification rather than truth as the central normative concept in constitutional
reasoning." Justification is agent-relative, while truth is not. Thus, jusfirmation of this sort is all we need for constitutional objectivity. Consider Rorty's words:
"IT]he desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible." R. Rorty,
Solidarity or Objectivity?, supra note 94, at 23. In this view, the distinction between constitutional knowledge and constitutional opinion "is simply the distinction between topics
on which such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get." Id.
97. Justification must not be formally equated with either consensus or truth. Free
and reflective consensus or intersubjective agreement is, however, evidence of justification
in ideal circumstances.
98. In this view, the notions of truth and truth conditions are suspect and should be
abandoned. See Field, The Deflationary Conception of Truth, in Fact, Science and Morality 55, 56 (G.MacDonald & C. Wright eds. 1986) ("A prevalent view in the early days of
the Vienna Circle was that the notions of truth and of truth conditions are a piece of
useless metaphysics that we ought to abandon.") [hereinafter Field, The Deflationary
Conception of Truth].
99. Robert Benson nicely describes the foe of determinacy as "a person who inhabits
an enormous cultural web, sees connections between all the threads, and mercurially
imagines how they could be taken apart and reconnected in different ways." Benson,
Deconstruction's Critics, the TV Scramble Effect, and the Fajita Pita Syndrome, 85 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 119, 120 (1990) (specifically describing Professor D'Amato). An individual
devoted to truth as an explanatory and constraining concept would never seek, nor could
he tolerate, deliberately taking apart our cultural web and imagining better ways of putting it back together again. Instead, a devotee of truth seeks to understand how this web
reflects the way the world is.
100. The distinction between truth and justification is reflected in Robert Brandon's
view that the philosophy of language can be divided into two schools: representationalism and social practice theory. See Brandon, Truth and Assertibility, 73 J. Phil. 137, 13739 (1976). Representationalism is concerned with truth and the way the world is, see id.
at 137, while social practice theory is concerned with assertibility and social practice, see
id. at 137-38.
Similarly, advocates of determinacy contend that a sentence's meaning is not exhausted
by citing social practices, and hence sentences can have a univocal and unchanging meaning. Detractors believe that meaning is merely a function of social practices and therefore
cannot produce univocal and unchanging meaning.
Imagine an objection to this classification on the ground that determinate meaning can
also be based on social practice. In this case, one cannot distinguish between the two
kinds of meaning on the basis of social practice. If you believe, however, that sentences
have determinate meaning and that meaning is a function of social practice, you must
show how social practices can produce a singular meaning. I suggest that social practices
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tification permits indeterminacy, but truth does not.
A.

Theories of Truth

How can this issue between truth and justification be resolved?10°
Truth appears to play a familiar role in reasoning and inquiry.102 Thus,
in order for a belief to constitute knowledge and thereby have the appropriate hold over us, the belief must be true. Although philosophers have
offered many different conceptions of truth, the correspondence theory of
truth, 10 3 more so than any other theory,"° has become the dominant
conception of truth in the Western world. According to this theory, a
belief is true when it pictures, mirrors, or reflects the external world or
create layers of meaning. These layers of meaning, though sometimes compatible, are
often contradictory or exist in tension with one another. In fact, just how to characterize
the point of the social practice is itself contestable, perhaps even ineradicably so. Cf
Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 167, 171-72 (1956)
(noting that defining or characterizing any contested concept requires that "each party
recognize[ ] the fact that its own use of [the concept] is contested by those [uses] of other
parties, and that each party must at least have some appreciation of the different criteria
in the light of which other parties claim to be applying the concept in question").
The social practices upon which constitutional conclusions ultimately depend usually
include contestable and controversial layers of meaning. For example, the social practice
upon which due process rests is an amorphous web of attitudes and values about liberty
and privacy. A proponent of abortion identifies and emphasizes certain strands of this
web, while the anti-abortion proponent emphasizes other strands. Unless the social practices upon which due process derives its meaning become simple and uniform, the term
"due process" will continue to be indeterminate. The point here is best summarized by
saying that truth typically considers meaning to be a determinate result of the way the
world is, while justification sees meaning as the indeterminate result of social practices.
101. It should be added that some foes of determinacy argue against both truth and
justification. See Singer, supra note 6, at 25-26. I am sympathetic to this perspective
when speaking about justification that is designed to compel assent. Alternatively, justification might be designed to guide and encourage agreement, while acknowledging that
agreement often is impossible.
102. One writer describes the familiar role of truth as follows:
Our ordinary concept of truth is . . . an extremely important one; it occurs
frequently, not only in everyday discourse, but in mathematical and scientific
discourse as well. Further, it is clear that many uses of this concept cannot
easily be avoided, perhaps cannot be avoided at all.... When we talk.., about
all statements of a given form being true, or about the truth of all the premises
of some unspecified argument, it is hard to see how we might express similar
thoughts without employing the notion of truth.
Etchemendy, Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence, 53 J. Symbolic Logic 51, 53
(1988).
103. See generally L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (D.F. Pears &
B.F. McGuinness trans. 1963) (embracing correspondence theory).
104. Other important conceptions of truth are: the coherence theory, see Davidson, A
Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in Truth & Interpretation: Perspectives on
the Philosophy of Donald Davidson 307, 307-19 (E. LePore ed. 1986); the semantic conception of truth, see Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth, 4 Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 341, 358-59 (1944); the disquotational view of truth, see Field, The Deflationary
Conception of Truth, supra note 98, at 55-118; and the pragmatic conception of truth, see
generally W. James, The Meaning of Truth (1975).
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external reality.10 5 Moreover, the fact that the belief reflects reality provides both the explanation and the justification of the belief. According
to correspondence theorists, as I understand them, there is a sharp distinction between truth and justification. Truth reflects what is real, while
justification tells us the best way to discover truth. In this framework, it
is possible for us to be justified in what we believe, although our beliefs
might still be false.' 016
A correspondence theory, then, is usually tied to realism, although the

two positions are not identical.'

7

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this

essay, I will call anyone holding a correspondence theory of truth a realist.' 0 Realists contend that our statements and beliefs copy a reality that
105. See Singer, supra note 6, at 28-30. I do not consider the view that principles of
reasoning exist which compel belief.
106. This framework permits the possibility of skepticism. Because there is a sharp
divide between what is true and what is justified, our beliefs might be justified and yet not
be true. In response, mainstream theorists argue that skepticism can either be refuted or
ignored. See J. Finnis, supra note 88, at 70-75; R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 15-86; see
generally Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wisc. L. Rev. 1061, 1063, 1063-1156 (attempting
to "rebut[ ] most of the skeptic's claims"). I think none of these positions is correct. See
Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 874-77 (arguing that a modified skepticism
will remain a permanent element in practical reasoning). But see Williams, The Elimination of Metaphysics, in Fact, Science and Morality 9 (G. MacDonald & C. Wright eds.
1986) (arguing that skepticism is pointless).
The real trick is to imagine, if possible, what our culture would be like if no one ever
took skepticism seriously-if no treatises were ever written to combat skeptical doubt; if
no one ever held out skepticism as a pitfall to be avoided; if people thought that skepticism, though possible, was just not interesting; if skepticism simply failed to capture anyone's imagination. Such a future might produce more exciting and more visionary
narratives describing possible experiments in social interactions, as well as novel ideals
toward which individuals could strive. Of course, some theorists might believe that certain forms of skepticism drive inquiry in helpful ways.
The traditional realist framework creates the possibility of divisions in our intellectual
landscape. Because scientific and common sense claims appear to correspond to external
reality, some areas of inquiry-such as, ethics and value theory-are supposed to be illegitimate because their subject matter fails to correspond to anything in the external
world. What does "goodness," "rightness," or "obligation" refer to? What does
"beauty," "harmony," or "grace" picture? The realist framework thus sometimes distinguishes between science and ethics, treating the former as a subject of knowledge and the
latter as a subject of some weaker, even illegitimate, form of inquiry. Not surprisingly,
the fact/value distinction arises with special force in a realist framework that identifies
truth with correspondence. Law lies on the value side of the dichotomy and so, if truth is
correspondence, law is not subject to truth or falsity. For an interesting attempt to defeat
the stepchild status of morality and law, see Moore, supra, at 1061 (arguing that moral
realism is the best explanation of our experience); see also Boyd, How to Be a Moral
Realist, in Essays on Moral Realism 181 (G. Sayre-McCord ed. 1988) (arguing for moral
realism).
107. Davidson believes that an intimate connection exists between correspondence and
realism. See Davidson, The Structure and Content of Truth, 87 J. Phil. 279, 304 (1990)
("[tlhe realist view of truth.., must be based on the idea of correspondence").
108. Philosophical or metaphysical realism is the view that statements in science, ethics, and everyday life are true and reflect an external reality that exists independently of
minds or perceivers. See H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History 49 (1981). This view
should be distinguished from "legal realism," which seeks to discover the actual causes of
judicial decisions in contradistinction to reasons for those decisions.
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is independent of both mind and language. 10 9 The external facts that

comprise reality make our beliefs true. Realism, in other words, looks to
reality to explain and justify our beliefs and values, as well as the pro-

gress that humankind (especially science) has made in understanding the
world. 110 In a realist's view, truth plays a strong explanatory and justifi-

catory role in the etiology of our beliefs. Thus, I call realist theories of
truth that play this strong explanatory and justificatory role "strong theories of truth."'1 1
According to a strong theory of truth, the fact that a belief or sentence
represents external facts or corresponds to reality is sufficient to explain
why the sentence is true. Realism, as incorporating a strong theory of
truth, appears to conform to the common sense notion that what makes
the sentence
"The cat is on the mat" true is the cat and his presence on
112
the mat.
Does a strong theory of truth really provide the appropriate sort of
explanation and justification of beliefs and statements?" 3 Given the
109. See H. Putnam, supra note 108, at 49. Realism, as I see it, maintains that truth is
a certain type of relation between cognitive states or sentential attitudes and the external
world.
110. In the traditional view of scientific progress, "the growth of science delivers ever
closer approximations to fundamental truths about the physical world." Leplin, Truth
and Scientific Progress, in Scientific Realism 193, 193 (J. Leplin ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Leplin, Scientific Realism].
111. Strong theories of truth are contrasted with weak theories of truth. Theories of
the latter type retain the use of the word "true," but jettison its explanatory and justificatory force. A weak theory of truth determines whether a belief is justified and then, if it
is, calls it true. On a weak theory, truth does not provide an explanation or justification
of the belief. In fact, in such theories, truth plays no epistemic role at all. See generally
Davidson, supra note 107, at 307-19 (arguing for a weak theory of truth).
112. Some realist theories of truth are committed to the view that words refer to objects in the world. See H. Putnam, supra note 108, at 49. But see R. Barthes, Criticism &
Truth 40 (1987) ("[i]n the last analysis, words no longer have any referential value, only
an exchange value: their function is to communicate").
113. Recently, Richard Rorty has inveighed against the correspondence theory of
truth. See generally R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers
Volume 1 (1991); R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980); R. Rorty, Consequence of Pragmatism (1980).
Rorty's distaste for truth rests on his belief that it is a trivial notion, and that freedom is a
much more important concern. See Rorty, Truth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy, 16 Critical Theory 633, 634 (1990) [hereinafter Rorty, Truth and Freedom]; R.
Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth:
Philosophical Papers Volume I at 175 (1991). Rorty wants to know what will encourage
unforced agreement in free and open encounters. For Rorty, it is pointless to seek a
"God's-eye" view from which to evaluate everything. See Rorty, Truth and Freedom,
supra, at 633. All we need is the notion that we might be wrong in some of our beliefs
and values. In other words, "fallibilism" is the only thing we need, not an Archimedean
point of view. See id. at 635.
Rorty fails to realize that fallibilism itself is the beginning of a God's-eye view. The
notions of correctness and criticism imply getting beyond oneself. If we can't try to get
out of our skins, then we can't endorse fallibilism. Correcting one's present view means
seeking a more general one. Only by comparing my beliefs with those of others can I
learn that mine are mistaken. While such a view may not represent getting out of our
skins, it nonetheless makes talk about doing so pragmatically fruitful as a regulative ideal.
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number of questions the theory leaves unanswered, the answer to this
question is certainly "no." For example, if such a theory explains and
justifies the sentence "The cat is on the mat," how does it explain and
justify its negation-namely, "The cat is not on the mat"? If the negation is true, what "negative" fact explains this? Additionally, how does a
strong theory of truth explain the truth of the sentence "Four is divisible
by two"?

Still other questions remain unanswered. For instance, what is the relationship between a true belief or sentence and the external world? And,
even further, how do we know that true beliefs correspond to the external
world? Do we compare the sentence with reality?" 4 To what do true
sentences correspond?" 5 What is the relation of correspondence between the true belief and reality? Do we intuit this relation? What sense

can we give to the locution that a true sentence corresponds to or pictures reality? How does reality "make" a sentence true? These questions
seem to be insurmountable problems for the correspondence theory of
truth. 11 6 Rather than attempting to answer these questions-an effort

probably doomed in advance-we should query what better explanation
of truth is possible beyond our
using truth as a means of endorsing and
17
commending certain results.
Furthermore, we can use this regulative ideal without reinstating truth. But see Rorty,
Truth and Freedom, supra, at 642-43 (denying that such an ideal is pragmatically

fruitful).
114. Inevitably, this leads to comparing one set of beliefs with another set of beliefs.
See Hempel, On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth, 2 Analysis 49, 58 (1935) (noting

"that there is no essential difference left between protocol statements"--statements which
provide a foundation for empirical statements and beliefs---"and other statements" and
beliefs).
115. The obvious answer is that true sentences correspond to facts. But what is a fact?
According to Davidson, "there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true
sentences might correspond." Davidson, supra note 107, at 303. Take the relatively simple sentence "The cat is on the mat." Do you point to the cat? The relation of "onness"? The mat? Does "mat" refer to the mat? What do demonstratives and logical
connectives correspond to? As Strawson observes:
It is evident that there is nothing else in the world for the statement itself to be
related to either in some further way of its own or in either of the different ways
in which the[ ] different parts of the statement are related to what the statement
is about. And it is evident that the demand that there should be such a relatum
is logically absurd .... But the demand for something in the world which
makes the statement true..., or to which the statement corresponds when it is

true, is just this demand.
Strawson, Truth, in Logico-Linguistic Papers 190, 194 (1971) (emphasis added). In other
words, our saying that a statement corresponds to the facts is just "a variant on saying
that it is true." Id at 195.
116. I do not suggest that those endorsing strong theories of truth have no replies to
these objections. I do suggest, however, that the continuing philosophical controversy
over the nature of truth should give constitutionaland legal theorists pause. They should
entertain the possibility that, however the philosophical controversy is settled (if it ever
is), constitutional and legal theorists should abandon the notion of truth or at least consider it no more than a trivial notion.
117. Similar problems abound in the context of constitutional adjudication. Constitutional scholars love to quarrel over whether the right to non-discriminatory governmental
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In this anti-realist view, truth at best is a function of how well a sentence or belief coheres with other sentences and beliefs.1"' We inherit a
system of beliefs and values from society. Once we begin to consciously
criticize and correct our system of beliefs and values, the touchstone of
whether to add or retain them is how well they conform to other attitudes we have about the world. 19 A coherence conception of truth thus
defines truth as coherence. But clearly that is a crazy view, as all sorts of
coherent sets of sentences are possible that are not even remotely true.
Distinguishing between truth as coherence and justification as coherence might assist us here. Coherence in the context of justification permits us to start out with those beliefs and values we can't imagine giving
up. This does not mean we make any claim about the truth of these
beliefs and values. Rather, they are intuitive starting points that correct
newly-acquired beliefs and values and, in turn, are correctable by them.
Coherence need not be a definition of "truth." 120 Rather, coherence
practices is in the Constitution, as if this were the same sort of question as whether the
cookies are in the jar or whether the cat is on the mat. The presumption of this kind of
question is that a uniquely correct answer exists that is conceptually distinct from the
process of justification. Once truth is abandoned, however, we see that justification cannot yield uniquely correct answers.
118. One objection to the coherence theory of truth can perhaps be dispelled here.
Coherentism must be wrong, because there are some beliefs and values we just can't give
up. For example, two such attitudes seem to be the notions that murder is wrong, and
that pleasure is prima facie good. If these attitudes can't be given up, then something like
the realist project must be true.
The coherentist might reply that my inability to give up the above moral judgments
reflects linguistic usage rather than substantive moral views. I might not be able to give
up the belief that murder is wrong, but I still might abandon the view that abortion is
murder. In other words, how we describe a value often determines whether we can give it
up, not whether it reflects an inner or outer reality.
119. But what do we do if it turns out that "a system is coherent but bad"? Radin, The
Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699, 1710 (1990). I do not see how this
is a problem. If we say that some of our beliefs and values are coherent but bad, it must
mean that we have other beliefs and values according to which the former are bad. The
problem here is not bad coherence as much as what happens if we have more than one set
of coherent beliefs and values. In such a case, coherentism might lead to mutually incompatible perspectives that we have no way of evaluating further. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 844. Of course, in identifying which beliefs and values are
important, there is always the danger that "coherentism may turn into complacent or
aggressive conventionality or traditionality." Radin and Michelman, Pragmatist and
PoststructuralistCriticalLegal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019, 1047 (1991). Additionally, coherentism is designed to replace both a correspondence theory of truth and the
quest for an Archimedean perspective external to our conceptual scheme. This doesn't
mean, however, that we must accept each and every belief and desire that coheres with
some part of our conceptual scheme. Each individual is entitled to weigh, rank, and
interpret her beliefs and values as she thinks best. Consequently, feminists can plausibly
argue that once we identify the role of liberty and equality in our conceptual scheme, we
will see that gender inequality is morally and politically unacceptable.
120. For James, a belief is true if it works; "everything we know conspiring with the
belief, and nothing interfering .. " W. James, Pragmatism 99 (1975); accord W. James,
The Meaning of Truth 118-19 (1975). Because definitions of truth are subject to obvious
objections, similar to the objections to defining good contained in the naturalistic fallacy,
I do not offer a definition of truth. If I were to define truth, warranted assertibility would
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focuses on the sort of justificatory strategies that come naturally to us.
This view leaves truth undefined and suggests that truth is where we rest
after employing the best justificatory strategies available. On this view,
truth is a univocal, honorific notion that applies equally to all legitimate
domains of human inquiry.' 2 1 With regard to truth's role in the epistemological structure of inquiry, the answer is simple: truth has no such

role. 122
A realist might respond that we have no coherent notion of justification if we abandon the concept of truth. According to this argument, a
sentence is justified just in case it is true or when we have adequate reason for believing it true. In either case, the notion of truth plays a central
role. In the first case, truth is what justifies a sentence, while in the second, the concept of truth is relied upon to explicate the concept of
justification.
This criticism is important, but ultimately it can be defeated. The objection assumes that by calling for the abandonment of truth, we are retaining our traditional framework concerning truth, justification, and
knowledge. Thus, a call to truncate this framework by excising truth and
perhaps knowledge leaves a conceptually impoverished form of justification. Because this framework defines the interrelationships among truth,
justification, and knowledge, none is possible without the others. My
point, however, is to challenge this framework, or at least its utility in
constitutional jurisprudence. Throw out the framework, and along with
it, the conception of justification that makes this objection plausible. Instead, I am offering an alternative conception of justification-a conception of justification that is especially useful in constitutional theory. This
conception assumes that justification is all we ever have or need.
Suppose someone objects that a coherence theory of law is also concerned with both justification and truth. In other words, a theory of law
is justified only when it is intra-theoretically self-consistent, and it is true
when no better intra-theoretically consistent system exists. Consequently, coherence theorists are also concerned with justification and
truth. If correct, this argument applies only to a weak, trivialized conception of truth. A strong theory of truth says that we are justified in
adopting a particular interpretation of a constitutional provision because
that interpretation is true.' 23 A person might argue, for example, that a
capture the pragmatic justificatory spirit. See Putnam, What is Realism?, in Scientific
Realism 140, 150 (J. Leplin, ed. 1984) (speculating about a shift from truth to "warranted
assertibility").
121. Legitimacy is here defined pragmatically, and not epistemically. An area of inquiry is legitimate if it generally assists us in achieving our needs and desires. Coping
with our physical environment is one such need. Coping with our value environment is

another.
122. See Williams, Do We (Epistemologists)Need A Theory of Truth?, in 14 Phil. Topics 223, 225, 241 (Spring 1986) (casting doubt on the idea that epistemologists need
truth).
123. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
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constitutional proposition is justified if it follows from a correct constitutional theory. In turn, a theory is correct because it reflects or mirrors
reality-that is, it reflects natural law or the basic structure of the Constitution.124 In this event, one has a strong theory of truth. If, on the
other hand, what explains the reliability or truth of a set of sentences is
its coherence with other such sentences, and that the ultimate test for
reliability is coherence, one has a weak theory of truth. It is a weak
theory of truth because truth is conceptually dependent upon coherence.
My call for abandoning the notion of truth should be understood as calling for the abandonment of strong theories of truth. If you think that
truth explains justification, then you have a strong theory of truth and
you should abandon it. If, on the other hand, you think justification explains truth, then you have a weak conception of truth, and whether you
abandon or retain the word "true" has no practical implications for constitutional theory and therefore is entirely trivial. Indeed, to say that
justification explains truth is just to say that we pragmatically dignify the
best justification with the title of truth. In such a scheme, truth is a
front. Justification does all the work.
One problem with the suggestion of abandoning truth is that doing so
appears to side with the idealist concerning central disputes in metaphysics, epistemology and value theory.' 2 5 The idealist denies that truth exists as a mind or language independent of relation.' 26 Additionally, the
idealist denies that scientific or ethicalfacts exist, or that there really is a
scientific and ethical reality "out there."12' 7 Interestingly, in the weak
sense of truth, both scientific and ethical propositions are equally true,
and both reflect facts that constitute reality. It is just that saying so does
not add anything of importance28 to arguments about controversial scientific, ethical, or legal matters.'
124. Saying that a constitutional proposition reflects reality is not necessarily to endorse a realist ontology. You do not have to say that constitutional propositions reflect
constitutional facts, where such facts are metaphysical entities not accessible to common
sense. Nor must you say that constitutional propositions reflect natural facts. It only
means that we cannot ultimately be justified in asserting constitutional propositions without some interesting explanatory notion of that proposition's truth. No such notion
exists.
125. See Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn For the Worse?, 41
Stan. L. Rev. 871, 903 (1989) (arguing that Rorty's rebuttal of the correspondence theory
of truth, and specifically his attack on realism, "use[s] the exact same arguments as the
idealist metaphysician"). But see Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 856-60)
(rebutting Moore's criticism of Rorty).
126. For a classical empiricist version of idealism, see generally G. Berkeley, Of the
Principles of Human Knowledge, in Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous 53-113 (R. Woolhouse, ed. 1988).
127. See Glymour, Conceptual Scheming or Confessions of a Metaphysical Realist, 51
Synthese 169, 179-80 (1982) (describing metaphysical realism).
128. Abandoning a strong notion of truth has special significance in constitutional law.
Because constitutional actors are a diverse lot, it would do well to reject any conception
of meaning that does not make meaning a function of diverse social practices. Of course,
this doesn't preclude (nor does it entail) a limiting case-namely, making constitutional
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For example, the ethical realist believes that murder is wrong, but so
does the ethical anti-realist. This reflective aversion to murder is the central meaning of both realist and anti-realist statements. 21 9 The additional
trappings of each position are philosophicaltrappings that do not add to,
but instead detract from, getting on with settling important controversial
constitutional and ethical issues. Consider again the murder example.
The realist often insists that realism provides an explanatory basis for the
claim that murder is wrong. Nevertheless, how does realism explain
this? What more can realism add to the judgment that murder is wrong
that is not already present? If the awareness of intentional, unjustifiable,
and inexcusable homicide does not prompt your judgment that murder is
wrong, how will realism do so? If you need realism to prompt this judgment, you simply will not get the judgment. And, if you already have the
judgment, you do not need realism.
Nor does this argument side with the anti-realist. Instead, it suggests
that we redirect the subject to resolving substantive controversies, and
side-step the realism/anti-realism controversy entirely. Rather than exerting precious philosophical energy on the search for a realist conception of truth, let us instead concentrate on formulating plausible
conceptions of justification--conceptions that unify, refine, and perfect
actual methods of generating reliable beliefs and values.
B. A Pragmatic Conception of Justification
Justification can be understood in the following manner. A statement
is justified if it is endorsed by qualified practitioners in a given domain of
inquiry. What prompts agreement is pragmatic success. 130 All things
being equal, agreement of qualified practitioners achieved in the appropriate circumstances is evidence of the pragmatic success of the statement. Consequently, constitutional justification can be characterized as
intersubjective agreement prompted by pragmatic utility.'31
Pragmatic success is just another way of saying that a justified constimeaning a function of the social practices that a qualified constitutional actor would endorse in ideal circumstances.
129. This central meaning is similar to the notion of "core meaning" discussed in Fine,
The Natural OntologicalAttitude, in Scientific Realism, 83, 96-102 (J. Leplin, ed. 1984).
130. We must distinguish between consensus over particular judgments and consensus
over political perspectives. Law codifies those particular judgments that achieve consensus. This does not mean that the same sort of consensus is required for political perspectives. In fact, it is doubtful that such consensus is even possible. See Lipkin, Beyond
Skepticism, supra note 3, at 825-26, 831.

131. Endorsing a sentence means that that sentence will play a certain role in our
system of beliefs and values. We adopt such a system because its adoption is beneficial.
Should the realist say that a system is beneficial only if reality makes it so, then let him.
The result is entirely trivial. Because pragmatic utility, and not correspondence, is our
goal, a realist of this sort follows the pragmatic strategy. We can therefore tolerate his
nostalgia for realism when he says that reality makes pragmatically beneficial results beneficial. What we reject is the contention that realism provides a deeper explanation than
pragmatic success.
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tutional decision is prized because it helps us cope with our constitutional environment. It assists us in coping with those internal tensions
that cause crises in our constitutional theory, as well as with those external crises brought about by the social and political circumstances in
which we live. As an example, if the decision in Brown v. Board of Education 132 helps us to deal adequately with racial justice in education,
under the auspices of the equal protection clause, then it has the sort of
pragmatic efficacy endorsed in this Article.
A theory of pragmatic justification must allow for the probability of
change. It must even encourage change and show how change sometimes leads to further agreement, or how it sometimes strains the fabric
of agreement. Pragmatic justification stresses that "the quest for timeless
political principles is perverse."' 33 Further, pragmatic justification is
committed to the view that
"political and epistemic change are enduring
1 34
features of human life."
Pragmatic justification also has a contextual dimension. A particular
position is justified when the reasons in support of it outnumber those of
concrete alternatives. Few propositions are ever justified once and forever. Because justification occurs only in comparison to other possibilities, a statement is always more or less justified relative to other
statements. Similarly, the contextual dimension of pragmatic justification does not countenance artificial dichotomies between fact and value.
Instead, according to pragmatic justification, "is and ought, fact and
value, are systemically interwoven." '35
A philosophical conception of truth as correspondence, or any strong
conception of truth purporting to explain why we hold the beliefs we do,
is unlikely and unnecessary in constitutional theory. Such a strong conception of truth is unlikely because the best theorists have been unable to
devise such a notion of truth. Moreover, it is unnecessary because constitutional theory has operated well without such a notion of truth. This
last point needs some elaboration.
In my view, constitutional adjudication and theory have historically
functioned with a weak conception of truth-that is, a conception of
truth that perfunctorily follows from having the best justification-and
not vice versa. Yet, there is no difference between urging the abandonment of the concept of truth, and trivializing truth by denying its explanatory efficacy. Constitutional theorists, whether aware of this or not,
have constructed their theories and have argued for substantive conclusions without having a strong notion of truth.
One might argue that if constitutional theory had a strong conception
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. D. Herzog, Without Foundations: Justification in Political Theory 236 (1985)
[hereinafter Without Foundations].
134. Id. at 236.

135. Id. This is not to say that it is appropriate to deduce values from facts. See id. at
237.
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of truth, interminable controversies in constitutional law might be
avoided. If a strong explanatory notion of truth was possible, this argu-

ment might indeed be plausible, in which case it might be prudent to
search for such a conception despite its historical failures. But the point
of asking us to abandon the notion of truth is that no one knows how to
make a strong conception of constitutional truth even remotely plausible.

If constitutional truth explains our constitutional beliefs, then wherein
does this truth reside? Is it in the Constitution? Natural law? Social
convention? Where? To date, no one has provided any argument showing that any of these sources compel us to accept the notion of a strong
conception of truth. Additionally, even if it were plausible to speak of
constitutional truth as residing in natural law, the Constitution or social
convention, no one has ever explained the precise nature of these sources
or how we can derive non-controversial conclusions from them. Finally,
even if we agreed on the precise nature of these sources, no one knows

how to show that constitutional interpretations correspond to these
sources.

Justification in constitutional law, as elsewhere, involves individuals in
a particular community-in this case the constitutional communityagreeing on the utility of a particular interpretation of the Constitution.1 3 6 The relevant community is "us"-American judges, lawyers,
and citizens-and that usually involves local justification. 137 Nevertheless, a more global justification is required in principle whenever you are
confronted by any individual whose interest is affected by 13your proposed
justification and who can raise a challenge to your view. 1

With pragmatic justification, an individual always directs his argument
towards some audience. 139 I might first justify my anti-war stance to136. The conception of justification offiered here makes it "unreasonable... to require
that political questions always have one right answer." Id at 236.
137. See A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment
233 (1990).
138. In order not to beg any questions against disadvantaged humans or non-human
animals, the challenge can be raised by a person representing an individual whose interests are affected.
139. Thomas Scanlon argues that, according to contractualism, we are motivated by a
"desire to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably
reject." Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism,in Utilitarianism and Beyond 116

(A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982) (footnote omitted). Indeed, we can only make sense of
justification if we understand it as a social process. See generally L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1968).
This desire for justification will not result in a specious consensus. Consider:
We all might like to be in actual agreement with the people around us, but the
desire which contractualism identifies as basic to morality does not lead us simply to conform to the standards accepted by others whatever these may be. The
desire to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not
reasonably reject will be satisfied when we know that there is adequate justification for our action even though others in fact refuse to accept it... Similarly, a
person moved by this desire will not be satisfied by the fact that others accept a
justification for his action if he regards this justification as spurious.
Scanlon, supra, at 116.
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ward my friends or colleagues. Next, I might direct it toward my neighbors or the citizens of my town, followed by my region and so forth.1 40 It
is helpful to think of the context of justification as a coliseum in which
there are circular rows, each row representing different kinds of audiences toward which I direct my justifications. Ultimately, the "us" refers
to every relatively informed member of this decade or of the century in
which I live.14 When I say everyone, I mean1 42every individual who could
or would choose to challenge my argument.
What implications does this conception of justification have for constitutional theory? Generally, it asserts that theories implicitly or explicitly
dependent on the notion of truth must be abandoned or reformulated as
theories of justification. When a strong theory of truth is retained, constitutional jurisprudence, though pluralistic, appears as if it is in utter
disarray. Thus, reformulating constitutional jurisprudence in terms of a
theory of justification permits us to ascertain the pluralistic nature of

constitutional theory. 143

Interestingly, this constraint applies equally to both Robert Bork's and
Ronald Dworkin's theories of interpretation. Although Bork does not
explicitly use truth as a predicate, his theory depends upon truth or some
similar notion. According to Bork, originalism should be adopted because it is the only legitimate way to interpret law. 44 But nowhere does
Bork offer a political justification for his methodology. As a theory of
justification, Bork's theory should be evaluated in terms of the pragmatic
justification offered in this essay. Can Bork's methodology facilitate
agreement on controversial constitutional issues? Moreover, can we
reach agreement on the utility of Bork's methodology? Probably not,
because, as a theory of justification, Bork's originalism fails to achieve
pragmatic success. Nevertheless, that is where the argument should lie.
Dworkin explicitly uses the conception of truth. In his view, a legal
proposition is true if it follows from the best constructive interpretation
of the relevant legal practice.1 45 Because he believes in the concept of
140. When seeking to validate our beliefs or desires, "[w]e try to justify ourselves, but
we cannot justify ourselves by ourselves, and so morality takes shape as a conversation
with particular other people, our relatives, friends, and neighbors; or it takes shape as a
speculation on what arguments might, or should, persuade such people of our righteousness." M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 47 (1987).
141. Pragmatic justification must proceed from the center of the coliseum but it must
also filter to its outer limits. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. Anyone
who can make her argument understood must be taken seriously. If two views, A and B,
both pass critical muster according to Western standards, but B also answers a Trobriand
Islander objection and A does not, then B represents a pragmatically superior justification than A.
142. Of course, actual justification seldom involves the entire coliseum. See A. Gibbard, supra note 137, at 253.
143. The pluralistic dimension of constitutional theory reflects the essentially pluralistic nature of human society. See Berlin, The Pursuitof the Ideal, in The Crooked Timber
of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas 1-2, 13 (H. Hardy, ed. 1991).
144. See R. Bork, supra note 9, at 143.
145. See R. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 225.
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truth, Dworkin believes there are uniquely right answers even in hard
legal cases." Although Dworkin's conception of truth is a weak conception because it follows from the best justification and not vice-versa, it
still distorts his conclusion. Dworkin's use of the predicate "is true" precludes him from perceiving the relational or agent-relative character of
law as integrity.147 It makes no sense to say that a proposition is true for
me and not true for you, and so Dworkin must insist on his one right
answer thesis. Once Dworkin's theory is recognized as a theory of justification and not of truth, the fact that different justifications work for different people will become apparent, and his theory can be evaluated in
those terms.
Ultimately, constitutional justification depends upon its audience's imagination and shared ideals. It is a weak notion of justification, because it
can identify some common ground and persuade others to endorse the
decision, but it cannot, and would not if it could, compel assent.' 48
III.

THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION:
NORMAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ADJUDICATION AND
WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

The motivation for abandoning truth in constitutional theory and en-

dorsing justification is pragmatic. 149 Pragmatic constitutionalism is the
best strategy for weathering the storm of acute crisis currently raging in
constitutional theory. Crisis can have both positive and negative dimen-

sions. Positively, crisis can generate new and exciting paradigms for carrying constitutional discourse into its subsequent historical moment. On

the down side, however, crisis can become chronic and, when it does,
constitutional theory will continue to founder. This final section of the

Article explores the possibility of combining two paradigms: a revised
146. See id at 266.
147. In Dworkin's view, a legal decision is true if it follows from the best interpretation
(explanation and justification) of the community's legal practice. See id. at 225. What
counts as the "best interpretation," however, is in part subject to a particular judge's
explanatory and justificatory judicial values. Because Dworkin provides few limits to the
scope of these values, they will inevitably differ across judges. Consequently, there will be
different right answers, rather than uniquely right ones. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism,
supra note 3, at 843-44.
148. This form of justification can be visionary and utopian. We must keep in mind,
however, that visionary or utopian solutions work only in the appropriate historical circumstances, and cannot always be counted on to win the day. The conspicuously American predicament is that the founding generation, though flawed, fashioned a visionary
and utopian experiment, the results of which were specifically left to the future to decide.
149. Contemporary pragmatism means all things to all people. I use the term to refer
to an anti-foundationalist conception of constitutional inquiry. None of the big-picture
conceptions of legal epistemology-namely, objectivity, reason, formalism, and so
forth--can be part of this pragmatic stance. I retain the word theory, however, in its
non-formalistic incarnation. Constructing a "theory," in my view, is simply telling a
story about how best to proceed in a given domain. Additionally, the theoretical pragmatic stance taken in this article is not antithetical to certain forms of skepticism; indeed,
it embraces them.
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version of Rawls's methodology of wide reflective equilibrium with a
modified conception of Kuhn's theory of scientific change, in such a
manner as to provide a pragmatic strategy for transporting constitutional
theory into the next century.
A.

The Theory of ConstitutionalRevolutions

The chief obstacle to providing an acceptable paradigm for constitutional theory is "the unitaristic fallacy."'- 50 A theory commits the
unitaristic fallacy when it includes only a unitary paradigm of constitutional change.15 1 Only theories that recognize the non-unitaristic nature
of constitutional reasoning can account for constitutional change. 152
Hence, some non-unitaristic theory is likely to provide the appropriate
paradigm with which to carry on constitutional litigation.' 5 3
Bruce Ackerman offers an interesting dualistic theory of change by
distinguishing between normal politics and "higher politics."' 54 Normal
politics consist of those ordinary political events based primarily on self-interested motives, while "higher politics" constitute those rare constitutional moments that set the moral and political tone of American
constitutionalism.' 55 According to Ackerman, the Founding, Reconstruction, and the Revolution of 1937 are examples of "higher politics."' 56 He writes:
[T]he Constitution establishes a two-track law-making system. If our
elected politicians hope only to win normal democratic legitimacy for
an initiative, they are directed down the normal lawmaking path and
told to gain the assent of the House, Senate, and President in the normal ways. If, however, they hope for higher lawmaking authority, they
are directed down a specially onerous lawmaking path ...
Ackerman's distinction is between two kinds of law-making, one that involves the majoritarian forces, while the other involves the judiciary.
Ackerman's project seems specifically designed to avoid, if not resolve,
the counter-majoritarian problem. Judicial review need not be crudely
majoritarian because it has higher purposes in mind-namely, the rights
and liberties of a trans-temporal majority.
150. Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at 703.
151. Conventionalism, coherentism, pragmatism, and natural law are examples of
unitaristic theories. Each theory permits only one conception of constitutional change.
See id. at 703-08.
152. See id. at 706 & n.13.
153. See id.
154. See Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale L.J. 453, 461
(1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics].

155. See id.
156. See id.at 456; see also, Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1051-52 (1984) (discussing "higher politics").
157. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 154, at 464.
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Steven Winter criticizes Ackerman's dualism for being too narrow.15
In Winter's view, there is a third stage of constitutional law called the
"trimorphic mode."'15 9 This stage involves the "sedimentation" of constitutional law, which directly shows how judicial review can be democratic. Winter's term "sedimentation" refers to those values and norms
that structure an individual's understanding of social reality.'6 Thus, he
argues:
The trimorphic mode of constitutional change, in contrast, is democratically superior. In this mode, the relentless processes of social and
cultural construction produce new sedimentations that are first institutionalized in social practice and then concretized as constitutional
rules. In its highest form, trimorphic jurisgenesis is marked by a moment of conscious, situated reflection in which the Court probes the
development of and experience with these social
norms before trans61
muting them into constitutional commands.'
Through the process of jurisgenesis,1 62 trimorphic change is thus "tested
in practice before the Court articulate[s] it as a standard that carrie[s]
with it the force of law and the force of the Constitution."'' 63 Moreover,
Winter writes:
From a trimorphic perspective, the mid-century obsession with the
countermajoritarian difficulty seems a little quaint, if not peculiar. The
ordinary course of constitutional jurisgenesis reflects the dynamic nature of the social and cultural processes upon which it depends and, in
that very sense, is democratic. In contrast, most conventional theories
of judicial review need some knowable, authoritative, foundational moment of democratic decisionmaking that validates subsequent judicial
action.a64

But what makes the process of jurisgenesis democratic? Winter, I
think, persuasively stresses how sedimentation occurs as a social and cultural process. It is nevertheless difficult to see how that process is itself
democratic in any sense of the term. Slavery, Jim Crow, homophobia,
sexism, and injustices of other sorts expressed in Supreme Court decisions might well have come about in the way Winter describes. That
does not, however, show them to be the results of a democratic process,
or even show the process of sedimentation to be a morally acceptable
form of social change. Sedimentation, as a social and cultural process,
would be democratic only if it could be independently established that
158. See Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1441, 1515 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Indeterminacy].
159. See id.at 1515, 1520.
160. See id. at 1520.
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. See Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword Nomos and Narrative,97
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1983) (jurisgenesis is the process described by Cover as "creat[ing]
... legal meaning... through an essentially cultural medium").
163. Winter, Indeterminacy, supra note 158, at 1521.
164. See id. (citations omitted).
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the dynamic sedimentary forces occurred democratically. In other
words, if everyone were relatively equal and had equal access and opportunity to express their need for change, then perhaps the sedimentary
processes could be described as democratic. 165 In a society like ours,
however, having an unfortunate record on matters of race, sex, and class,
democratic influences are not likely to be a central part of the sedimentary process.
Alternatively, in order to explain democracy, conventional theories of
democracy appeal to some actual historicalmoment designed explicitly to
garner the consent of the governed. For judicial review to be democratic,
it must be defensible according to a defensible theory of democracy.
Thus, the process of sedimentation cannot show how judicial review is
democratic for the simple reason that sedimentation need not occur democratically. Instead, sedimentation may only express the interests of the
rich and powerful. For this to happen, the rich and powerful need not
consciously or deliberately manipulate sedimentary forces in order to express their interests. Rather, the social system in conjunction with the
process of sedimentation may quite naturally express their interests. In
Winter's view, therefore, when this occurs, the judiciary should look to
this sedimentary process-favoring the rich and powerful-and fashion
it into a rule of law. 166 But, this is a conclusion that we should resist.
The idea that constitutional litigation ultimately involves a non-unitary theory that unites Ackerman and Winter is, I believe, correct.
Thomas Kuhn has provided the ingredients of a framework for this triadic conception of constitutional change. 167 In an earlier article, I
deployed Kuhn's views on scientific change 68 as the basis of a theory of
constitutional revolutions. The theory of constitutional revolutions is
designed to show the appropriate role that conventionalism, pragmatism,
and coherentism play in constitutional change.
165. It is not obvious that it would be completely democratic even in this way. American democracy is primarily based on a theory which prizes conspicuous moments-legislative or executive decisions, elections, ratifications, and so forth-in which individuals
consciously and reflectively consent to be governed.
166. Any view seriously advocated by any political party or movement has its foundation in the sedimentary process. This includes both the good and the bad.
167. See generally T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970); see
also, R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 320 (1979) (distinguishing between
normal and revolutionary discourse). Several legal theorists have noticed the relevance of
Kuhn's conception of scientific change to constitutional and legal change. See Winter,
Indeterminacy,supra note 158, at 1507 n.336; Singer, supra note 6, at 34; Lipkin, Conventionalism, supra note 87, at 648 n.3; Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at
730-34; Castro, The Erie Doctrineand the Structure of ConstitutionalRevolutions, 62 Tul.
L. Rev. 907, 910-11 (1988).
168. See Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at 730-34. I do not believe
that the use of the theory of revolutionary adjudication is limited to constitutional
change. Indeed, it might play as important a role in the development of the common law
as it does in constitutional law. I am not aware, however, of any substantial attempt to
show how this theory works in other than constitutional law contexts, and so we must
wait until the work is done before we can determine its plausibility.
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In its present form, the theory of constitutional revolutions describes

three stages of constitutional change: normal litigation, revolutionary lit-

igation, and post-revolutionary litigation.169 Normal litigation occurs
when there is a stable paradigm-such as constitutional text, judicial precedent, statute, or administrative rule-that the constitutional community generally agrees is relevant to the case, although there might be
some disagreement over the precise application of the paradigm. 7 Normal litigation involves problem-solving that fills in the details of the paradigm. Normal litigation thus applies to the many federal cases that never
get published
or, if published, never make any remarkable changes in the
17
law.

1

Sometimes normal litigation becomes more complex and controversial.
The paradigm governing the particular area of law does not appear to
resolve the questions then being litigated.17 1 When this occurs, following

the model of normal science, constitutional practitioners ordinarily attempt to quell and settle the problems facing the paradigm. One of two

consequences will result. Either a new judicial decision will settle the
problems then facing the paradigm, or no judicial solution will be possible within the context of that paradigm. At that point, the area of law in
169. See Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at 736-43 & nn.148-50 &

172. More specifically, normal adjudication involves routine litigation that is relatively
uncontroversial; revolutionary litigation is litigation that clearly results in new law; and
post-revolutionary adjudication is that period in which a revolutionary paradigm is refined, perfected and stabilized. See id at 739-42.
170. See it at 742-43. Paul Feyerabend criticizes Kuhn's distinction on the grounds
that normal and abnormal science exist at the same time. That is, at any given time, a
scientific community engages in both kinds of scientific change. See Feyerabend, Consolationsfor the Specialist, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 197, 211 (I. Lakatos
& A. Musgrave eds. 1970). I do not think, for our purposes, that this defeats the distinction. As long as we can specify in which ways the litigation is normal, revolutionary, and
post-revolutionary, the distinction is a useful one.
171. In common law contexts, especially in torts and contracts, normal litigation has a
big job to do. In these areas there are an enormous number of details to fill in. Consider
the concept of proximate cause. Establishing the meaning of "proximate cause" requires
common law judges to define and redefine the notion across a multifarious range of fact
situations. The job of explicating the meaning of proximate cause in a variety of cases
illustrates normal common law adjudication.
172. For fifty-eight years, the equal protection paradigm found in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), of "separate but equal" governed constitutional adjudication in the
area of equal protection. In the 1930s, however, the paradigm in Plessy began to erode,
ultimately being overruled in fact, if not in theory, by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). See also Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (validating
the state's refusal on racial grounds to admit Blacks to the only state law school); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that special restrictions on
black students at an integrated university violated equal protection); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (invalidating the state's refusal to admit Blacks to a white law school
despite the existence of a state law school for Blacks because the white law school was
superior).
During this period, Plessy came under more and more criticism. The separate but
equal paradigm was no longer adequate to settle civil rights issues. Finally, in 1954, the
Brown decision (together with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)) normalized adjudication over the issue of, if not the remedy for, racial segregation.
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question faces a crisis. In a period of constitutional crisis, a new paradigm must be forged if normal litigation is to occur again.' 7 3
When normal litigation faces trouble, precursors to revolutionary decisions may occur, ultimately leading to a revolutionary decision.' 74 A
revolutionary decision occurs when a new paradigm is forged that either
resolves the difficulties faced by the old paradigm, or creates an entirely
new set of questions and a new program for their resolution. Revolutionary litigation drives the evolution of the law. Without it, constitutional
change (if existing at all) would be markedly different than actual constitutional practice suggests. Once a revolutionary decision is made, the
law in that area enters into a post-revolutionary period in which the
newly-minted paradigm is refined, perfected, and stabilized. Law tends
towards stabilization because it is only through stabilization that normal
litigation can again occur. Normal litigation is constitutional change's
reward, because it permits constitutional actors to predict the answers to
constitutional questions. Furthermore, normal litigation permits stability and the orderly extension of constitutional principles. Thus, if a paradigm cannot be stabilized it will ultimately be overturned. 7 5
Constitutional paradigms vary. Some paradigms are procedural, while
others substantive. 176 Further, some constitutional paradigms integrate
procedural and substantive paradigms in a manner that appears unique
to American constitutionalism. For example, both due process and equal
protection analysis deploy a procedural paradigm such that, depending
on which part of the paradigm the Court chooses to apply to a case, a
particular substantive decision results. In this way, the 1937 Revolution
created a paradigm that granted deference to majoritarian forces, except

in cases involving individual rights or suspect classifications.
Constitutional evolution includes both internal and external crises. In173. Within the context of normal litigation, paradigms reign with little controversy
until crisis occurs. The Civil War was the limiting case of such a crisis. In this crisis, war
ultimately determined the nature of the federal union. The debate between states' rights
and nationalism predated the Constitution. More importantly, the Constitution itself
proved unable to resolve the debate, thereby showing the limits of the constitutional compromise embedded in the Constitution.
174. See supra note 172.
175. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), aptly illustrates this point. Throughout Roe's
twenty year tenure, the Court has unsuccessfully tried to normalize adjudication in this
area. Through a series of cases, however-including the abortion funding cases of Maher

v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); and Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991)--Roe's instability has been thoroughly established. In fact, given the tenor of the
controversy over Roe in late twentieth century America, abortion cases are incapable of
normal adjudication under Roe's paradigm. Doubtless, Roe will be directly overruled or
overruled sub silentio in the near future.
176. For example, the law of federal jurisdiction involves a procedural paradigmnamely, the requirements for litigating a case before a federal court. The paradigm in
Brown v. Board of Education, however, involves substantive rights that can be vindicated
in federal courts. Needless to say, procedural paradigms can affect substantive
paradigms.
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ternal crises are inconsistencies and conflicts that occur in the law itself.
One sort of internal crisis occurs when the Court interprets a constitutional provision with insufficient foresight concerning its legal ramifica-

tions. 17' Or, a crisis might occur because rules in one area conflict with

rules in another area.' 8 External crises, in contrast, are crises brought
about by extra-constitutional forces. Social and political crises-such as
economic depression, segregation, war, and gender inequality-all involve external crises. In addition, there are hybrid crises that are
brought about as a result of extra-constitutional factors combining with
internal conflicts over the rules or principles in a given area of the law. 7 9

Presently, the United States faces a constitutional crisis over abortion.

With the increasing whittling away of Roe v. Wade,' s0 the Court is constitutionally permitting the states to pass different, even incompatible,
abortion legislation. Congress can, if it chooses, pass uniform legislation

concerning18 1abortion, but that would take an enormous degree of political
fortitude.

One problem with the theory of constitutional revolutions is that, if
correct, it appears to be only an external description of constitutional
change. It tells us very little about how judges decide cases from the
internal point of view.18 2 Certainly, it will be helpful for judges to know

when their case is an example of normal litigation or revolutionary litigation. But how are they to know this? Clearly, a supplementary pragmatic strategy must be developed.
This supplementary pragmatic strategy is wide reflective equilibrium.
Wide reflective equilibrium is a pragmatic strategy for formulating an
individual's or a society's beliefs and values. It begins with what we hold
dear and, by criticizing these beliefs and values, thereby encourages
change. This pragmatic strategy asks us to evaluate our fundamental
177. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528

(1985), the Supreme Court reversed its decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), on the ground that the test for the "traditional governmental functions" paradigm was "unworkable." See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
178. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1948) (illustrating a clash between and

among property rights, contract rights, and equal protection).
179. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (representing a hybrid crisis
consisting of the constitutional and social tensions created by segregation).
180. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. Interestingly, one possible solution to this controversy might be through scientific

technology. Were it possible for a fetus to be placed in an artificial womb at conception,
much of the force of endorsing choice would be eviscerated. Because the sui generis
relationship between a fetus and mother would no longer need to exist beyond concep-

tion, it would be difficult to see how pro-choice fervor could be sustained. Indeed, it
would then be difficult to imagine why someone would choose to have an abortion. Some
pro-choice advocates might still insist on the right to abortions, either on principle or
because sometimes a woman will choose to have an abortion when a safe extraction is no
longer possible. In the former case, the right in Roe is more than a right to terminate a
pregnancy. It is the right not to be a parent. But what implications does this have for
infanticide?
182. The internal point of view is that perspective from which a person acts, based
upon the reasons and norms with which she identifies.
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values against various theoretical proposals for carrying on. By adjusting
our values as well as the proposed theory, we might find a theoretical
perspective that is a good match. At that time, when we hold our values
and a theoretical perspective in balance, our values are held in wide reflective equilibrium with our theory. 8 3
B.

The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in the Theory of
ConstitutionalRevolutions

Wide reflective equilibrium and the theory of constitutional revolutions are two sides of the same coin. Before explaining what this means,

however, let us explore three different movements or tensions in the
notion of wide
reflective equilibrium:
84

intuitionism, formalism, and

coherentism. 1

Each one of these movements answers the question of how one should

choose when intuitions and principles or theories collide. Intuitionism
and formalism give different a priori answers to this question. Intuitionism says that, in cases of conflict, we should always choose intuitions
over theories. Formalism, on the other hand, counsels us to choose theory over intuitions. In this view, if one has an appropriately elegant theory that is heuristically derived from a set of considered intuitions, but
also conflicts with some important intuitions, then we should abandon
the intuitions. Coherentism, finally, best reflects the pragmatic dimension of wide reflective equilibrium by rejecting a priorisolutions (of either
type) to this problem. Coherentism tells us to fiddle with both our considered intuitions and our theory in order to achieve equilibrium. 85
To say that wide reflective equilibrium and the theory of constitutional
revolutions are two sides of the same coin is to say that the three move183. For a more detailed characterization of wide reflective equilibrium, see Lipkin,
Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 865-70; Lipkin, Kibitzers, supra note 2, at 111-30.
184. In an earlier piece, I contrasted wide reflective equilibrium with intuitionism and
formalism. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 868-69. I should also point
out that, within wide reflective equilibrium itself, there are intuitionist and formalist
movements. See, e.g., W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics 82-86 (1939) (describing the
anti-theoretical dimension of intuitionism); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal
Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1103, 1201 (1983) (describing the role intuitions play in
legal theory); see generally I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1964)
(stating the classical formalist theory of ethics); R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963)
(arguing for a contemporary formalist theory of ethics). As theories distinct from wide
reflective equilibrium, intuitionism and formalism are unpersuasive. Intuitionism takes
our intuitions too seriously, whereas formalism does not take them seriously enough. See
Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 868-69. In contrast, wide reflective equilibrium captures the pragmatic insight that both intuitionism and formalism involve overly
rigid methodological principles. See Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at
723-27.
Let me qualify my use of the term "formalism." I do not mean what is ordinarily
understood as "legal formalism." See supra note 1. Rather, I am describing a reformist
view that theories, principles, and even utopian visions should not necessarily be sacrificed in order to preserve intuitions.
185. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20 (1971).
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ments in wide reflective equilibrium have counterparts in the theory of
constitutional revolutions. Put simply, the theory of constitutional revolutions describes constitutional reasoning when viewed from the external
perspective, while wide reflective equilibrium describes constitutional
reasoning when viewed from the internal perspective. When deciding a
case, a judge-or, for that matter, any practical reasoner-looks first to
her considered intuitions. In the case of judicial decision-making, a
judge's intuitions must include a fairly uncontroversial reading of the
law. This reading must respect what the Constitution, case law, statutes,
or administrative rules initially mean to a qualified constitutional practitioner.1 86 From this starting point, the judge then looks to see if there
exist broader justificatory principles that prompt a reinterpretation of
what the law is to a qualified constitutional practitioner. Wide reflective
equilibrium determines these broader principles. If the judge determines
that these principles dictate a reinterpretation of her initial judgment, her
initial judgment should be changed according to the principle.18 1 If not,
she should apply the initial judgment as it stands.
When a large area of law is beset with internal and external problems
in which judges continually reinterpret prior judicial decisions, a constitutional crisis exists, and it is appropriate to engage in revolutionary adjudication in order to transform that area of law. Such a transformation
requires the existence of attractive justificatory principles that are extrinsic to the law.
Wide reflective equilibrium drives judicial reasoning from the internal
point of view. When several judges or the Supreme Court decide a case
formalistically from the internal point of view, revolutionary decisions
are made.18 8 By contrast, normal adjudication takes place when judges
routinely support the initial judgment of a qualified constitutional practitioner. In normal litigation, there is overwhelming reason to opt for the
intuition rather than a new justificatory principle. Ordinarily, the reason
186. Let me state two points at the outset. First, I believe that all legal judgments are
the result of interpretation. I do not wish to contrast interpretation with textualism or
other positions that insist that we understand a statute simply by reading it. I do believe,
however, that certain interpretations at certain times and places are much more obvious
than others. Thus, interpreting Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution as requiring the
president to be a resident of the United States for fourteen years prior to assuming the
presidency is a much better interpretation than, in contrast, an interpretation requiring
that the president have sufficient familiarity with our culture and history. See U.S. Const.
art. II, § 5. Consequently, there are readings of case law by ordinary legal interpreters
that are more obvious and more likely than others.
187. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Justices'
initial intuition must reflect the principle of "separate but equal" set forth in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The broader justificatory principle is the anti-segregation
principle in Brown, with which the Justices effectively transformed the law.
188. For example, when in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965), the
Court sought a normatively compelling principle of privacy, they did so from the internal
point of view. The importance of privacy or personal autonomy warranted setting aside
the traditional (intuitive) interpretation of the due process clause. From the external
point of view, this decision is seen as revolutionary.
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for opting for the initial judgment-that is, the reason for normal adjudication-is to achieve stability and predictability. In revolutionary adjudication, judges choose a new justificatory principle over their initial
judgments in order to quell a constitutional crisis. Consequently, in normal adjudication, wide reflective equilibrium operates in favor of the intuition. In revolutionary adjudication, wide reflective equilibrium
operates in favor of theory.1 89 And, in post-revolutionary litigationwhere a paradigm is perfected, refined, and stabilized-there is a much
greater interplay between intuition (initial judgments) and theory (normative constitutional principles). Sometimes we modify the intuition,
and sometimes we modify the theory. In this stage of adjudication, there
is simply no a prioriway to determine whether intuition takes precedence
over theory or vice versa.
The 1937 Revolution illustrates the operation of the above process.190
During the Lochner period, a qualified constitutional practitioner would
have intuitively judged that the Constitution protects individual economic rights against the majority, without any need for further theoretical reflection.191 The laissez-faire principle in Lochner represents an
explanation and justification of this intuition. The Lochnerian principle,
then, was the prevailing constitutional paradigm in economic affairs in
1937.
External economic circumstances ultimately forced the Court to retreat from this paradigm. The laissez-faire paradigm supported by Lochner clashed with Roosevelt's economic policy. The Depression and
Roosevelt's program for dealing with it represented an external constitutional crisis in the area of economic policy. As the Depression worsened,
a new paradigm-namely, judicial deference to the legislature-acquired
a definite appeal. Consequently, in order to deal with the crisis, the
Court chose to fashion a new justificatory principle concerning its role in
scrutinizing legislative economic policy. The worsening crisis and this
important justificatory principle provided the impetus for the Court to
engage in revolutionary adjudication. The initial Lochner intuitions gave
way to a principle of deference that was considered a better justification
189. Consequently, in normal adjudication, wide reflective equilibrium favors intuitions, and, in revolutionary adjudication, wide reflective equilibrium favors theory.
There is nothing mechanical about this, however, because a controversy often exists over
whether a particular case should be considered an instance of normal or revolutionary
adjudication. While the notion of a crisis is important here, that too is a controversial
notion, and whether a constitutional crisis exists is often clear only after the area of law
has been settled.
190. The Revolution of 1937 altered the Court's role in reviewing economic legislative
policy. No longer would the Court strictly scrutinize legislation affecting economic affairs. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
191. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-57 (1905). This is not entirely true.
During this period, some economic regulations were sustained. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (sustained regulation of maximum hours men could work in the
manufacturing industry); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustained regulation of
maximum hours women could work).
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than the paradigm in Lochner.'92 By way of contrast, if the Court had
remained in the intuitionist mode, it would have retained the Lochner
paradigm and precluded both the 1937 Revolution and its new paradigm
of judicial deference. 193 The decision to engage in revolutionary reasoning-that is, to embrace a new paradigm rather than stick with wellentrenched intuitions--enabled Roosevelt's economic policy to win the
day without packing the Court. It also allowed the Court to fashion a
more complete paradigm, and to normalize constitutional litigation in
this area. 194
To summarize, normal adjudication corresponds to the intuitionist
movement in wide reflective equilibrium. When there is no sufficiently
attractive justificatory principle available, a judge will choose the intuitionist movement and opt for a conventionalist view of adjudication.
When a crisis exists, however, and there is a sufficiently attractive justificatory principle which will resolve the crisis, a judge will choose a formalist strategy. Finally, when the law is in a post-revolutionary period
and a newly-adopted paradigm is being refined, perfected, and stabilized,
the judge will adopt a coherentist approach. All three movements exist
at different times and circumstances in the context of wide reflective
equilibrium.
The theories of constitutional revolutions and wide reflective equilibrium represent a syncretic conception of how post-foundationalist constitutional culture can conduct its affairs. This syncretic conception does
not eradicate all the problems that post-foundationalist constitutional
theory will face. In fact, several immediate problems arise. First, will
wide reflective equilibrium be capable of reaching agreement across persons?1 95 Certainly, once constitutional practitioners adopt this pragmatic strategy, they will be able to achieve agreement on many issues.
Even so, the more controversial issues may still defy agreement.1 96 Second, the syncretic conception must determine how constitutional practitioners are to identify crises. In other words, how can one know whether
one faces normal or revolutionary adjudication? Third, is there any way
to distinguish between stabilizing a paradigm or unfairly cutting off its
reach?' 9 7 Should we even be concerned with making such a distinction?
192. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 392.
193. Some still argue that the Court should have defended the Lochner paradigm. See
R. Epstein, Takings 277-82 (1985).
194. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) is perhaps the best
statement of the present paradigm governing normal litigation in this area. The Carolene
Products paradigm defers to the legislature in economic matters, yet reserves a place for
strict judicial scrutiny where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved.
See CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596-98
(1977) (extending judicial deference to social welfare regulations). For a more expansive
treatment of how the theory of constitutional revolutions work, see Lipkin, Constitutional
Revolutions, supra note 55, at 727-43.
195. See Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, supra note 3, at 870.
196. See id.at 876.
197. For example, are the abortion funding cases, see supra note 175, correctly de-
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Fourth, can this syncretic conception account for our intuitions about
the rule of law?198 Should we be concerned about retaining this conception? Fifth, how does this syncretic conception argue against philosophical realism, natural-law theory, and other alternative conceptions of
constitutional practice? And finally, how does this syncretic conception
accommodate middle-level theoretical devices such as textualism,
originalism, and passivism?
These are all important queries. How we answer them will ultimately
determine the overall utility of this syncretic conception of constitutional
adjudication for taking us into our third century of constitutional
change.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that epistemic indeterminacy is the primary form of indeterminacy relevant to the law. The central reason for this is that it is
pragmatically pointless to separate metaphysical indeterminacy from epistemic indeterminacy. Epistemic indeterminacy, regardless of metaphysical determinacy, settles the question over law's competence. If there is
epistemic indeterminacy, then law or a legal system is indeterminate and
cannot generate univocal answers to controversial questions even if such
answers exist metaphysically.
Additionally, I have argued that the controversy over metaphysical or
epistemic indeterminacy is really a controversy over truth or justification
as the primary form of validating constitutional rules. I have urged us
either to abandon the notion of truth or to treat it as a trivial result of the
best justification.
Lastly, I have emphasized the present crisis in constitutional theory
and argued that we are in need of new constitutional paradigms. I have
urged that wide reflective equilibrium can be wedded with the distinction
between normal and revolutionary adjudication in such a manner as to
provide an interesting and complete account of constitutional adjudication and change.1 99
scribed as stabilizing the privacy paradigm, or as unfairly restricting this paradigm's appropriate extension into government funding contexts?
198. See Lipkin, ConstitutionalRevolutions, supra note 55, at 786.
199. I offer one final speculative note. Constitutional and legal theory will inevitably
come up with a new exciting paradigm or remain split between various contenders. In
the latter case, the crisis will remain and theory will remain independent of practice.
Practice, however, will continue. In these circumstances, if you believe theory is necessary to inform practice, you will believe that practice will suffer-perhaps irreparably. If,
on the other hand, you believe that practice fares independently and is not nourished by
theory, you will remain sanguine about the practice of law. A third possibility, in the
event that theory as traditionally understood appears to be superfluous, is that new forms
of reflection, presently unspecifiable, will develop with no structural unity. The reflection
thought to be the province of theory will be taken over by this new form of reflectioncall it, for lack of a better term, meta-practice. The difference between theory and metapractice will be that a meta-practical conception will be less abstract, more particularized,
and concrete. Further, meta-practice will not be concerned with either a general account
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of all practice, the resolution of controversial constitutional and legal issues, or the connections between practice now and practice in the future. Instead, meta-practic will be
content to have a deeper understanding of a particular field or sub-field of law, or even
merely a deeper understanding of a set of related questions in one sub-field.
One possible scenario of the evolution of meta-practice might be that those interested
in devising meta-practical accounts might only do so in the context of their own practice
as attorneys. In this hypothetical brave new world, no one will ever consider trying to
devise a meta-practical account as a theorist or scholar. Theory and scholarship, as those
terms are presently used, will no longer exist.

